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Welcome to the December 2015 Newsletters.  Highlights this 
month in a bumper set include:  
(1) In the Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty Newsletter: 
landmark best interests and capacity decisions in the medical 
treatment sphere, more on the cross-over between the MHA 
and the MCA, forced marriage, and the CQC’s latest DOLS 
report;  
(2) In the Property and Affairs Newsletter: gratuitous care, conflicts 
of interest and the OPG’s new guidance on safeguarding;  
(3) In the Practice and Procedure Newsletter: a very important 
decision on fact-finding (and when it is and is not necessary), 
and guidance – by analogy – from the Supreme Court on the 
‘urgency’ cross-border jurisdiction of the Court of Protection;  
(4) In the Capacity outside the COP Newsletter: DNACPRs notices 
and capacity, a College of Police Consultation on Mental Health 
practice, a coroner fully grasping capacity, the inaugural UK 
Mental Disability Law Conference and a book corner;  
(5) In the Scotland Newsletter: important amendments to the 
Education (Scotland) Bill, an important – and troubling – judicial 
review decision on ordinary residence in the cross-border 
context and guidance from the MWC on hidden surveillance.  
 
And remember, you can now find all our past issues, our case 
summaries, and much more on our dedicated sub-site here.   ‘One-
pagers’ of the cases in these Newsletters of most relevance to 
social work professionals will also shortly appear on the SCIE 
website.  
 
We are taking a break over the holiday period so (those of you who 
get them) happy holidays, and we will return in February from our 
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Placing the individual at the heart 
of decision-making even in an 
MCS 
 
M v Mrs N & Ors [2015] EWCOP 76  (Hayden J)  
 




[Editorial Note: the judge, Hayden J, expressly 
debated with himself whether it was necessary to 
review the progress of Mrs N’s condition, his 
instinct being to give priority to her privacy and 
the protection of her dignity.    He ultimately 
decided that he had to set out some of the key 
features of the progression of the disorder and 
Mrs N’s responses as part of the broad canvas of 
evidence which informed his ultimate decision.  
Whilst he needed to do so – he considered – so 
as to make clear that his reasoning was both 
transparent and uncompromised – the editors 
are not so bound and we therefore do not give 
those details in this judgment, which received 
wide publicity at the time.   We also mindful of 
the – characteristically thoughtful – observations 
of Lucy Series as to the level of detail given in the 
judgments in both this case and the C case also 
covered in this newsletter].  
 
This case is the first one in which the court has 
expressly sanctioned the withdrawal of Clinically 
Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (‘CANH’) from a 
person who is in – or was treated by the court as 
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being – in a Minimally Conscious State.1   It was 
brought by a woman, M, in respect of her 
mother, Mrs N, who profoundly impaired both 
physically and cognitively in consequence of the 
progressive degenerative impact of Multiple 
Sclerosis.  
 
Hayden J undertook a careful and comprehensive 
of the law starting – rightly – with the principles 
in ss. 1 and 4 MCA 2005.  He endorsed the 
‘admirably succinct’ submissions of the Official 
Solicitor recorded at paragraph 27, namely that:  
“(a) The court is the decision maker and thus 
has to make the decision by: 
 
(i) considering all relevant 
circumstances; and 
 
(ii) Taking the steps set out in section 
4(3) to (7):  see section 4(2); 
 
(b) There are no limits placed on the nature or 
type of circumstances which may be relevant 
to the decision.  It all depends on the facts of 
the case.  However, in order to take a decision 
properly which considers all relevant 
                                                 
1
 Strictly, it should be noted that the court in United 
Lincolnshire Hospital NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16, in 
which a woman in an MCS continually sought to pull a PEG 
tube out, Pauffley J declared that it was lawful and in her 
best interests for the clinicians (a) not to make any further 
attempt to secure a means of providing artificial nutrition; 
(b) to withdraw the provision of intravenous fluids and 
dextrose; and (c) to provide such palliative care and related 
treatment (including pain relief) as considered appropriate 
to ensure she suffers the least distress and retains the 
greatest dignity until such time as her life comes to an end.  
The case seems to have been treated subsequently as a 
‘withholding’ rather than a ‘withdrawal’ case but in 
particular in light of declaration (b) was a combination of 
both.   It is perhaps more accurate to say that this case 
represented the first case in which withdrawal was 
considered in a case where, absent such withdrawal, it 
would be expected that the individual would continue to 
live for an appreciable period of time.  
circumstances, the decision maker must 
undertake a proper inquiry into both:  
 
(i) P’s circumstances; and  
 
(ii) the type of decision that the 
decision maker is being called 
upon to make; 
 
(c) Baroness Hale explains in Aintree at §24 
that the Act does not propose a totally 
objective best interests decision making 
process but a compromise which is under the 
label of “best interests” but nonetheless is a 
compromise which contains a “strong element 
of substituted judgment”.  This compromise 
ensures that P as a human being remains at 
the very centre of decision-making concerning 
[them]; 
 
(d) The compromise is achieved by requiring 
the decision maker to ‘consider’ (i.e. take fully 
into account) both P’s past and present wishes 
and feelings:  see section 4(6)(a).  Whilst 
particular attention must be paid to 
expressions of P’s wishes and feelings that 
were written down by P at a time when P had 
capacity, the decision maker must inquire into 
and then consider all other evidence of wishes 
and feelings before taking the decision:  see 
§5.18 to 5.20 of the Code of Practice.  That 
other evidence can include evidence from 
relatives about P’s wishes and feelings which 
may assist the decision maker to understand 
P;   
 
(e) Separately to considering P’s wishes and 
feelings, the decision maker must also 
consider ‘the beliefs and values that would be 
likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity’.  This means that the decision maker 
must inquire into P’s beliefs and values. This is 
not limited to religious beliefs but beliefs and 
values about what matters were important to 
P, how they affected P’s view of the world and 
the factors which P thought were important in 
  
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter December 2015 
Compendium: COP Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty  
 
Click here for all our mental capacity resources                                         Page 4 of 54 
 
taking decisions for himself or herself.  This 
part of the statutory process asks the decision 
maker to inquire into and reach views about 
the general approach that P had to making 
decisions for himself or herself and to ask 
what factors were important to P in P’s own 
capacitous decision making as a prelude for 
asking what decision P would have made for 
himself or herself if P still had capacity; 
 
(f) The court also needs to look beyond P’s 
‘beliefs and values’ by considering any other 
factors that would, assuming P retained 
capacity, be have been likely to have 
influenced P in making the relevant decision:  
see section 4(6)(c).” 
Hayden J further highlighted the observations of 
Baroness Hale in Aintree at paragraph 39, namely 
that:  
“39. The most that can be said, therefore, is 
that in considering the best interests of this 
particular patient at this particular time, 
decision-makers must look at his welfare in 
the widest sense, not just medical but social 
and psychological; they must consider the 
nature of the medical treatment in question, 
what it involves and its prospects of success; 
they must consider what the outcome of that 
treatment for the patient is likely to be; they 
must try and put themselves in the place of 
the individual patient and ask what his 
attitude to the treatment is or would be likely 
to be; and they must consult others who are 
looking after him or interested in his welfare, 
in particular for their view of what his attitude 
would be.” 
and Re S (Protected Persons) [2010] 1 WLR 
1082, in HHJ Hazel Marshall QC had held: 
“55 In my judgment it is the inescapable 
conclusion from the stress laid on these 
matters in the 2005 Act that the views and 
wishes of P in regard to decisions made on his 
behalf are to carry great weight. What, after 
all, is the point of taking great trouble to 
ascertain or deduce P's views, and to 
encourage P to be involved in the decision-
making process, unless the objective is to try 
to achieve the outcome which P wants or 
prefers, even if he does not have the capacity 
to achieve it for himself? 
 
56. The 2005 Act does not, of course, say that 
P's wishes are to be paramount, nor does it lay 
down any express presumption in favour of 
implementing them if they can be ascertained. 
Indeed the paramount objective is that of P's 
‘best interests’. However, by giving such 
prominence to the above matters, the Act 
does, in my judgment, recognise that having 
his views and wishes taken into account and 
respected is a very significant aspect of P's 
best interests. Due regard should therefore be 
paid to this recognition when doing the 
weighing exercise of determining what is in P's 
best interests in all the relevant circumstances, 
including those wishes.” 
Hayden J noted that he had given these passages 
very considerable thought, but that:  
 “28. […] I draw from them only this:  where 
the wishes, views and feelings of P can be 
ascertained with reasonable confidence, they 
are always to be afforded great respect.  That 
said, they will rarely, if ever, be determinative 
of P’s ‘best interest’s’.  Respecting individual 
autonomy does not always require P’s wishes 
to be afforded predominant weight.  
Sometimes it will be right to do so, sometimes 
it will not.  The factors that fall to be 
considered in this intensely complex process 
are infinitely variable e.g. the nature of the 
contemplated treatment, how intrusive such 
treatment might be and crucially what the 
outcome of that treatment maybe for the 
individual patient.  Into that complex matrix 
the appropriate weight to be given to P’s 
wishes will vary.  What must be stressed is the 
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obligation imposed by statute to inquire into 
these matters and for the decision maker fully 
to consider them.  Finally, I would observe that 
an assessment of P’s wishes, views and 
attitudes are not to be confined within the 
narrow parameters of what P may have said.  
Strong feelings are often expressed non-
verbally, sometimes in contradistinction to 
what is actually said.  Evaluating the wider 
canvass may involve deriving an 
understanding of P’s views from what he may 
have done in the past in circumstances which 
may cast light on the strength of his views on 
the contemplated treatment.  Mr Patel, 
counsel acting on behalf of M, has pointed to 
recent case law which he submits, and I agree, 
has emphasised the importance of giving 
proper weight to P’s wishes, feelings, beliefs 
and values see Wye Valley NHS Trust v B 
[2015] EWCOP 60; Sheffield Teaching Hospital 
Foundation Trust v TH and TR [2014] EWCOP 
4; United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust  v N 
[2014] EWCOP 16.” 
Having cited paragraph 5.31 of the Code of 
Practice (addressing when it is proper for steps 
not to be taken to prolong life, Hayden J noted 
that:  
“30.  It is clear, therefore, that the framework 
of the Act and the scheme of the Code of 
Practice place great emphasis on the 
importance of personal autonomy and the 
obligation to be alert to direct or indirect 
discrimination against those who lack 
capacity.  Decisions taken in the ‘best 
interests’ of an incapacitous individual must 
factor in the recognition that respect for an 
individual’s past and present (where relevant) 
wishes and identifiable codes and beliefs by 
which he has lived are a crucial part of 
promoting best interests.   To subvert these to 
a substitution of an objective evaluation i.e. to 
superimpose what the Court thinks best, may 
result in indirect discrimination.  The central 
objective is to avoid a paternalistic approach 
and to ensure that the incapacitous achieve 
equality with the capacitous.” (emphasis 
added) 
From the legislative structure relating to Advance 
Decisions to Refuse Treatment (contained in 
ss.24-26 MCA 2005) Hayden J noted that: 
“[p]erhaps the most significant impact of these 
provisions is that they illustrate that the 
presumption of life, predicated on what is often 
referred to as the ‘sanctity of life’ or the ‘intrinsic 
value of life’, can be rebutted (pursuant to 
statute) on the basis of a competent adult’s 
cogently expressed wish.   It follows, to my mind, 
by parity of analysis, that the importance of the 
wishes and feelings of an incapacitated adult, 
communicated to the court via family or friends 
but with similar cogency and authenticity, are to 
be afforded no less significance than those of the 
capacitous” (paragraph 32, emphasis added).  
 
Hayden J analysed in detail both the competing 
medical evidence as to whether Mrs N was in an 
MCS or a Vegetative State, noting that there was 
agreement between the doctors as to the clinical 
findings and disagreement as to the correct 
nomenclature to be applied.   Which category she 
was in had important consequences legally, but 
was (he found) an arid debate clinically given that 
all ultimately agreed on the medical facts.  
 
Hayden J noted that it was well-established that, 
if Mrs N was in an MCS, then any evaluation of 
her best interests must involve a proper 
identification of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each proposed course: i.e. the 
‘balance sheet,’ noting – importantly – that “the 
balancing exercise is qualitative rather than 
quantitative.”    He usefully reminded 
practitioners of the observation of McFarlane LJ 
in Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) 
[2015] EWCA Civ 882 that, whilst some form of 
balance sheet may be of assistance to judges in 
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seeking to assess competing welfare issues [in 
that case relating to a child]: 
  
“52. […] its use should be no more than an 
aide memoire of the key factors and how they 
match up against each other. If a balance 
sheet is used it should be a route to judgment 
and not a substitution for the judgment itself. 
A key step in any welfare evaluation is the 
attribution of weight, or lack of it, to each of 
the relevant considerations; one danger that 
may arise from setting out all the relevant 
factors in tabular format, is that the 
attribution of weight may be lost, with all 
elements of the table having equal value as in 
a map without contours.” 
By contract, and citing A Hospital v SW [2007] 
Med LR 273, Hayden J noted that, if she was in a 
VS, the balance sheet itself did not apply, the very 
diagnosis establishing the futility of further 
intervention.    
 
Hayden J set out in detail and with care the 
evidence that he had heard as to the views and 
attitudes of Mrs N, noting that it left him with 
little doubt that: 
 
 “60 […] Mrs. N would have been appalled to 
contemplate the early pain, increasing 
dependency and remorseless degeneration 
that has now characterised her life for so long.  
I have no difficulty in accepting the family’s 
view that she would not wish to continue as 
she is.  More than that, she would have wished 
to have discontinued her treatment some 
considerable time ago.  
 
61. For one who has set such store by outward 
appearance and who has been so attentive to 
the impression she created on others, her 
decline, in the way I have outlined, is 
particularly poignant.  Some might well have 
endured all that Mrs. N has with phlegmatism 
and fortitude.  Mrs. N is simply not such a 
person.  I am satisfied, as the family say, that 
some considerable time ago now she had 
simply had enough and that, as they see it, to 
force nutrition and hydration upon her is to 
fail to respect the person she is and the code 
by which she has lived her life.” 
Hayden J noted that the Official Solicitor had, 
until the conclusion of the family’s evidence, 
taken the view that the strong presumption in 
favour of the benefit of the continuance of life 
had not been displaced, but that, following 
careful consideration, the Official Solicitor had 
concluded that it would be wrong for him to 
continue to oppose the application.    Whilst he 
did not criticise the Official Solicitor for so doing, 
he noted:  
  
“64. […] the Court was then left in the position 
of contemplating a serious and important 
development in the evolution of the case law 
in the absence of opposing arguments. I was 
instinctively uncomfortable with that situation.  
Accordingly, as is by now clear from this 
judgment, I required each of the experts to 
give evidence as well as those conducting the 
SMART assessment.  Mr Lock, notwithstanding 
the change of position, continued to act, in 
effect, as amicus to the Court, testing the 
evidence as it evolved.  
Hayden J emphasised the case was not 
concerned with the right to die, as no such right 
existed.   Rather:  
 
“70. […] What is in focus here is Mrs. N’s right 
to live her life at the end of her days in the way 
that she would have wished.  I am required to 
evaluate the ‘inviolability of life’ as an ethical 
concept and to weigh that against an 
individual’s right to self determination or 
personal autonomy.  Not only do these 
principles conflict, they are of a fundamentally 
different complexion.  The former is an 
ideological imperative found in most civilised 
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societies and in all major religions, the latter 
requires an intense scrutiny of an individual’s 
circumstances, views and attitudes.  The 
exercise is almost a balance of opposites: the 
philosophical as against the personal.  For this 
reason, as I have already indicated, I consider 
that a formulaic ‘balance sheet’ approach to 
Mrs. N’s best interests is artificial. 
 
71. As I have already set out and at some 
length, I am entirely satisfied that Mrs. N’s 
views find real and authoritative expression 
through her family in this courtroom.  I start 
with the assumption that an instinct for life 
beats strongly in all human beings.  However, I 
am entirely satisfied that Mrs. N would have 
found her circumstances to be profoundly 
humiliating and that she would have been 
acutely alert to the distress caused to her 
family, which she would very much have 
wanted to avoid.  LR told me that Mrs. N 
would not have wanted to have been a 
burden; that I also believe to be entirely 
reliable.  
 
72. There is an innate dignity in the life of a 
human being who is being cared for well, and 
who is free from pain.  There will undoubtedly 
be people who for religious or cultural reasons 
or merely because it accords with the 
behavioural code by which they have lived 
their life prefer to, or think it morally right to,  
hold fast to life no matter how poor its quality 
or vestigial its nature.  Their choice must be 
respected.  But choice where rational, 
informed and un-coerced is the essence of 
autonomy.  It follows that those who would 
not wish to live in this way must have their 




75.  […] Ultimately, I have concluded that her 
wishes, so thoughtfully presented by her 
family, coupled with the intrusive nature of the 
treatment and its minimal potential to achieve 
any medical objective, rebut any presumption 
of continuing to promote life.  Quite simply, I 
have come to the conclusion that it would be 
disrespectful to Mrs. N to preserve her further 
in a manner I think she would regard as 
grotesque.” (emphasis added).  
Comment  
 
It is difficult to know whether to be pleased or be 
concerned that it is now only in the 10th year of 
the MCA’s life that we are having such a spate of 
decisions that so squarely seek to place the 
individual at the heart of the process, whether 
that be as regards the assessment of capacity 
(the C case also reported in this issue) or in the 
determination of best interests.  Let us take the 
former course, and celebrate the fact that the 
courts are now determined to make such efforts 
to identify and (even if being careful not to say 
that they are being governed by) to respect the 
wishes of the individuals concerned where they 
can be identified.    
 
As with the Wye Valley case, this is a model of 
best interests decision-making.   That it may have 
represented an extension of the court’s 
jurisdiction into new areas is – frankly – neither 
here nor there because it did soon the basis of so 
careful an analysis and application of the core 
principles of the Act.    
 
One final procedural point should be noted.   N’s 
case was different to those previously considered 
by the courts in another way: her prolonged 
disorder of consciousness was caused not by a 
sudden onset acquired brain injury, but as a 
result of a degenerative disease.    The RCP 
Guidelines on Prolonged Disorder of 
Consciousness is very firmly focused upon those 
who have sustained a sudden onset profound 
acquired brain injury.  However, none of the 
experts who gave evidence before Hayden J (all 
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of whom had been involved in drafting the 
Guidelines) suggested that they were not 
relevant to the diagnostic issues before the court.   
Nor was there anything in Hayden J’s judgment to 
suggest that M’s application was anything other 
than appropriate or necessary – i.e. he did not 
dissent in any way from the clear statement 
made by Baker J (endorsed by the President) in W 
v M that applications to withhold or withdraw 
ANH from a person in VS or MCS must be 
referred to the court.   Treating Trusts and CCGs 
must therefore consider carefully whether they 
are required to bring applications for withdrawal 
of CANH from those in MCS (and indeed PVS) 
however caused.  That having been said, the 
editors hope that in due course the attention of 
the courts will be drawn firmly back to the 
observations of the Court of Appeal in Burke v 
GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 as to the extent to 
which applications to court are required by law as 
opposed to being good practice where the 
legality of the proposed course of action is in 
doubt (see paragraphs 70-80).   
 
Capacity at the limits  
 
Kings College NHS Foundation Trust v C and V 
[2015] EWCOP 80 (MacDonald J)  
 





[Editorial note: this case has attracted much 
media coverage, which has used much of the 
judge’s description of C’s unconventional and 
‘sparkly’ life-style.   Whilst we consider that the 
picture painted by MacDonald was one that 
sought – properly and sensitively – to examine C’s 
entire personality so as to be able to assess 
whether she had capacity to make the decision in 
question, we are conscious that there are 
ongoing proceedings as to whether C’s name 
should be revealed, and one of the points made 
on behalf of C’s family is as to the impact upon 
them of the case.   We also have some 
reservations about the extent to which the details 
of C’s lifestyle require wider circulation so as to 
be able to summarise the principles of law in 
play.   We have therefore taken a deliberate 
decision not to rehearse them in detail here, but 
instead to focus upon the law]. 
 
The question for MacDonald J was whether a 
woman, C had the capacity to decide whether or 
not to consent to the life-saving treatment that 
her doctors wished to give her following her 
attempted suicide, namely renal dialysis.  
Without such treatment the almost inevitable 
outcome was the death of C.  If the treatment 
were to have been administered the likelihood 
was that it would save C’s life, albeit that there 
remained an appreciable and increasing 
possibility that C would be left requiring dialysis 
for the rest of her life. C refused to consent to 
dialysis and much of the treatment associated 
with it. She was supported in that decision by her 
family, and in particular her two elder daughters 
G and V, who considered that she had the 
requisite capacity.  Along with the psychiatrists 
who had examined C on behalf of the treating 
clinicians (including by way of a second opinion), 
an independent expert jointly instructed by the 
Trust and the family considered that she lacked 
the material capacity (although his evidence was 
given very little weight by the court in light of 
serious shortcomings in his report).   C, who was 
‘present’ before the court by way of attendance 
notes of meetings with the representatives of the 
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MacDonald J began his judgment by reminding us 
of the clear – and long-established – principle 
that a capacitous individual is entitled to decide 
whether or not to accept medical treatment, 
including treatment.  As he noted at paragraph 2 
“[t]his position reflects the value that society 
places on personal autonomy in matters of 
medical treatment and the very long established 
right of the patient to choose to accept or refuse 
medical treatment from his or her doctor 
(voluntas aegroti suprema lex). Over his or her 
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign 
(John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859),” such that 
“where a patient refuses life saving medical 
treatment the court is only entitled to intervene in 
circumstances where the court is satisfied that 
the patient does not have the mental capacity to 
decide whether or not to accept or refuse such 
treatment. Where the court is satisfied, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the patient lacks 
capacity in this regard, the court may take the 
decision as to what course of action is in the 
patient's best interests.”  
 
MacDonald J took the opportunity to restate in 
clear form the principles relating to the 
assessment of capacity, which merit reproduction 
as a very useful tour d’horizon of the case-law 
decided since the MCA 2005 came into force:  
“25. The following cardinal principles flow 
from the statute (PH v A Local Authority 
[2011] EWHC 1704 (COP) at [16]). First, a 
person must be assumed to have capacity 
unless it is established that they lack capacity 
(Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 1(2)). The burden 
of proof lies on the person asserting a lack of 
capacity and the standard of proof is the 
balance of probabilities (Mental Capacity Act 
2005 s 2(4) and see KK v STC and Others 
[2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) at [18]).  
 
26. Second, determination of capacity under 
Part I of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is 
always 'decision specific' having regard to the 
clear structure provided by sections 1 to 3 of 
the Act (see PC v City of York Council [2014] 2 
WLR 1 at [35]). Thus capacity is required to be 
assessed in relation to the specific decision at 
the time the decision needs to be made and 
not to a person's capacity to make decisions 
generally.  
 
27. Third, a person is not to be treated as 
unable to make a decision unless all 
practicable steps to help him to do so have 
been taken without success (Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 s 1(3)).  
 
28.  Fourth, a person is not to be treated as 
unable to make a decision merely because he 
or she makes a decision that is unwise. It is 
important in this regard to recall the words of 
Peter Jackson J in Heart of England NHS 
Foundation Trust v JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP) 
at [7]:  
 
“The temptation to base a 
judgment of a persons capacity 
upon whether they seem to have 
made a good or bad decision, and 
in particular on whether they 
have accepted or rejected medical 
advice, is absolutely to be 
avoided. That would be to put the 
cart before the horse or, 
expressed another way, to allow 
the tail of welfare to wag the dog 
of capacity. Any tendency in this 
direction risks infringing the rights 
of that group of persons who, 
though vulnerable, are capable of 
making their own decisions. Many 
who suffer from mental illness are 
well able to make decisions about 
their medical treatment, and it is 
important not to make unjustified 
assumptions to the contrary." 
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29. Likewise, the outcome of the decision 
made is not relevant to the question of 
whether the person taking the decision has 
capacity for the purposes of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (see R v Cooper [2009] 1 
WLR 1786 at [13] and York City Council v C 
[2014] 2 WLR 1 at [53] and [54]).  
 
30. Within these contexts, the fact that a 
decision not to have life saving medical 
treatment may be considered an unwise 
decision and may have a fatal outcome is not 
of itself evidence of a lack of capacity to take 
that decision, notwithstanding that other 
members of society may consider such a 
decision unreasonable, illogical or even 
immoral, that society in general places 
cardinal importance on the sanctity of life and 
that the decision taken will result in the 
certain death of the person taking it. To 
introduce into the assessment of capacity an 
assessment of the probity or efficacy of a 
decision to refuse life saving treatment would 
be to introduce elements which risk 
discriminating against the person making that 
decision by penalising individuality and 
demanding conformity at the expense of 
personal autonomy in the context of a diverse, 
plural society which tolerates a range of views 
on the decision in question (see Mental 
Incapacity (1995) (Law Comm No 231) (HC 
189), [1995] EWLC 231, para 3.4).  
 
31. Fifth, pursuant to s 2(1) of the 2005 Act a 
person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if 
at the material time he is unable to make a 
decision for himself in relation to the matter 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance 
in the functioning of, the mind or brain (the so 
called 'diagnostic test'). It does not matter 
whether the impairment or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain is permanent 
or temporary (Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 
2(2)). It is important to note that the question 
for the court is not whether the person's ability 
to take the decision is impaired by the 
impairment of, or disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain but rather 
whether the person is rendered unable to 
make the decision by reason thereof (see Re 
SB (A Patient: Capacity to Consent to 
Termination) [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP) at 
[38]).  
 
32. Sixth, pursuant to s 3(1) of the 2005 Act a 
person is "unable to make a decision for 
himself" if he is unable (a) to understand the 
information relevant to decision, (b) to retain 
that information, (c) to use or weigh that 
information as part of the process of making 
the decision, or (d) to communicate his 
decision whether by talking, using sign 
language or any other means (the so called 
'functional test'). An inability to undertake any 
one of these four aspects of the decision 
making process set out in s 3(1) of the 2005 
Act will be sufficient for a finding of incapacity 
provided the inability is because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain (see RT and 
LT v A Local Authority [2010] EWHC 1910 
(Fam) at [40]). The information relevant to the 
decision includes information about the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
deciding one way or another (Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 s 3(4)(a)).  
 
33. The order in which the relevant terms of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are drafted 
places the 'diagnostic test' in s 2(1) before the 
'functional test' in s 3(1). However, having 
regard to the wording of s 2(1), namely, "he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in 
relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain" (emphasis 
added), the order in which the tests are in fact 
applied must be carefully considered. In York 
City Council v C [2014] 2 WLR 1 at [58] and 
[59] McFarlane LJ (with whom Richards and 
Lewison LLJ agreed) held as follows:  
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"It would be going too far to hold 
that in approaching matters in 
this way Hedley J plainly erred in 
applying the law. His judgment 
refers to the key provisions and 
twice refers to the nexus between 
the elements of an inability to 
make decisions set out in s 3(1) 
and mental impairment or 
disturbance required by s 2(1). 
There is, however, a danger in 
structuring the decision by looking 
to s 2(1) primarily as requiring a 
finding of mental impairment and 
nothing more and in considering s 
2(1) first before then going on to 
look at s 3(1) as requiring a 
finding of inability to make a 
decision. The danger is that the 
strength of the causative nexus 
between mental impairment and 
inability to decide is watered 
down. That sequence - 'mental 
impairment' and then 'inability to 
make a decision' - is the reverse of 
that in s 2(1) – 'unable to make a 
decision … because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in 
the functioning of, the mind or 
brain' [emphasis added]. The 
danger in using s 2(1) simply to 
collect the mental health element 
is that the key words 'because of' 
in s 2(1) may lose their 
prominence and be replaced by 
words such as those deployed by 
Hedley J: 'referable to' or 
'significantly relates 
to'…Approaching the issue in the 
case in the sequence set out in s 
2(1), the first question is whether 
PC is 'unable to make a decision 
for herself in relation to the 
matter', the matter being re-
establishing cohabitation with NC 
now that he is her husband and 
now that he is has regained his 
liberty.". 
 
34. Within this context, it is important to 
remember that for a person to be found to 
lack capacity there must be a causal 
connection between being unable to make a 
decision by reason of one or more of the 
functional elements set out in s 3(1) of the Act 
and the 'impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain' required by s 
2(1) of the Act.  
 
35. In this case the Trust bases its submissions 
regarding the 'functional test' squarely on 
section 3(1)(c) of the 2005 Act, which provides 
that a person is unable to make a decision for 
himself if he is 'unable to…use or weigh' the 
relevant information as part of the process of 
making the decision (as the disjunctive 'or' 
comes after the negative, 'unable to' in s 
3(1)(c) the subsection requires the person 
asserting a lack of capacity to demonstrate an 
inability on the part of the individual to use 
and weigh the relevant information).   
 
36. In PCT v P, AH and The Local Authority 
[2009] COPLR Con Vol 956 at [35] Hedley J 
described the ability to use and weigh 
information as "the capacity actually to 
engage in the decision making process itself 
and to be able to see the various parts of the 
argument and to relate one to another".  
 
37. Within the context of s 3(1)(c) it is not 
necessary for a person to use and weigh every 
detail of the respective options available to 
them in order to demonstrate capacity, merely 
the salient factors (see CC v KK and STCC 
[2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) at [69]). Even 
though a person may be unable to use and 
weigh some information relevant to the 
decision in question, they may nonetheless be 
able to use and weigh other elements 
sufficiently to be able to make a capacitous 
decision (see Re SB [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP)).  
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38. It is important to note that s 3(1)(c) is 
engaged where a person is unable to use and 
weigh the relevant information as part of the 
process of making the decision. What is 
required is that the person is able to employ 
the relevant information in the decision 
making process and determine what weight to 
give it relative to other information required to 
make the decision. Where a court is satisfied 
that a person is able to use and weigh the 
relevant information, the weight to be 
attached to that information in the decision 
making process is a matter for the decision 
maker. Thus, where a person is able to use and 
weigh the relevant information but chooses to 
give that information no weight when 
reaching the decision in question, the element 
of the functional test comprised by s 3(1)(c) 
will not be satisfied. Within this context, a 
person cannot be considered to be unable to 
use and weigh information simply on the basis 
that he or she has applied his or her own 
values or outlook to that information in 
making the decision in question and chosen to 
attach no weight to that information in the 
decision making process.  
 
39. Finally, whilst the evidence of psychiatrists 
is likely to be determinative of the issue of 
whether there is an impairment of the mind 
for the purposes of s 2(1), the decision as to 
capacity is a judgment for the court to make 
(see Re SB [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP)). In PH v 
A Local Authority [2011] EWHC 1704 (COP) 
Baker J observed as follows at [16]:  
 
"In assessing the question of 
capacity, the court must consider 
all the relevant evidence. Clearly, 
the opinion of an independently-
instructed expert will be likely to 
be of very considerable 
importance, but in many cases 
the evidence of other clinicians 
and professionals who have 
experience of treating and 
working with P will be just as 
important and in some cases 
more important. In assessing that 
evidence, the court must be 
aware of the difficulties which 
may arise as a result of the close 
professional relationship between 
the clinicians treating, and the key 
professionals working with, P. In 
Oldham MBC v GW and PW 
[2007] EWHC136 (Fam) [2007] 2 
FLR 597, a case brought under 
Part IV of the Children Act 1989, 
Ryder J referred to a "child 
protection imperative", meaning 
"the need to protect a vulnerable 
child" that for perfectly 
understandable reasons may lead 
to a lack of objectivity on the part 
of a treating clinician or other 
professional involved in caring for 
the child. Equally, in cases of 
vulnerable adults, there is a risk 
that all professionals involved 
with treating and helping that 
person – including, of course, a 
judge in the Court of Protection – 
may feel drawn towards an 
outcome that is more protective 
of the adult and thus, in certain 
circumstances, fail to carry out an 
assessment of capacity that is 
detached and objective.’” 
(emphases in original) 
The first question for the court, MacDonald J 
held, was whether:  
71. […] the Trust has established on the 
balance of probabilities C is unable to make a 
decision about the matter in hand having 
regard to the matters set out in s 3(1) (the so 
called 'functional test'). The Trust accepts that 
C is able to understand the information 
relevant to the decision, to retain that 
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information and to communicate her decision. 
In relation to the remaining element of the 
functional test I am not satisfied that the Trust 
has proved to the requisite standard that C is 
unable to use and weigh the information 
relevant to the decision in question. 
 
72. Notwithstanding the submission of the 
Trust, I am not satisfied that C lacks belief in 
her prognosis or a future that includes her 
recovery to the extent she cannot use that 
information to make a decision, or that C is 
unable to weigh her positive prognosis and the 
possibility of a future recovery in the decision 
making process. In my judgment, the evidence 
in this case, when viewed as a whole, is 
indicative of C acknowledging that her 
prognosis is positive, that there is a possible 
future in which she survives and of her 
weighing that information in her decision 
making process.  
MacDonald J then reviewed that evidence in 
detail, noting that it was important to have 
regard that, in addition to the position that she 
had taken with regard to her prognosis, C had 
given a range of reasons for reaching the decision 
that she had regarding further treatment, and 
that she had undertaken the decision-making 
exercise on the basis of “placing into the balance 
many factors relevant to her decision” (paragraph 
91).    
 
As it was conceded by the Trust that C met the 
other criteria comprising the functional test, 
MacDonald J pronounced himself satisfied that C 
was not a person unable to make a decision for 
herself for the purposes of s.3(1) MCA and, 
accordingly, did not lack capacity to decide 
whether or not to accept dialysis.  He went on: 
 “93. [h]aving found that C is not a person 
unable to make a decision for herself for the 
purposes of s 3(1) it is not necessary for me to 
go on to consider the so called 'diagnostic 
test'. It is right to record that, as I observed at 
the conclusion of the hearing, had I been 
satisfied that C was unable to use and weigh 
information in the manner contended for by 
the Trust, I believe I would have had difficulty 
in deciding that this inability was, on the 
balance of probabilities, because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain. Whilst it is 
accepted by all parties that C has an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain, the evidence 
as to the precise nature of that impairment or 
disturbance was far from conclusive. Further, 
and more importantly, with regard to the 
question of causation, and in particular 
whether what was being seen might be the 
operation of a personality disorder or simply 
the thought processes of a strong willed, 
stubborn individual with unpalatable and 
highly egocentric views the evidence was 
likewise somewhat equivocal. However, as I 
say, I need say no more about this in light of 
my conclusions as set out above.” 
  
MacDonald J noted that his conclusion did not 
accord with the considered opinion of two very 
experienced psychiatrists, but was careful to make 
clear that this was “in large part a product of this 
being a finely balanced case in which a number of 
reasonable interpretations of the information 
available are possible” (paragraph 94).  
 
In concluding, MacDonald J noted that  
 
“97. The decision C has reached to refuse 
dialysis can be characterised as an unwise 
one. That C considers that the prospect of 
growing old, the fear of living with fewer 
material possessions and the fear that she has 
lost, and will not regain, 'her sparkle' 
outweighs a prognosis that signals continued 
life will alarm and possibly horrify many, 
although I am satisfied that the ongoing 
discomfort of treatment, the fear of chronic 
illness and the fear of lifelong treatment and 
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lifelong disability are factors that also weigh 
heavily in the balance for C. C's decision is 
certainly one that does not accord with the 
expectations of many in society. Indeed, 
others in society may consider C's decision to 
be unreasonable, illogical or even immoral 
within the context of the sanctity accorded to 
life by society in general. None of this however 
is evidence of a lack of capacity. The court 
being satisfied that, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, C 
has capacity to decide whether or not to 
accept treatment C is entitled to make her 
own decision on that question based on the 
things that are important to her, in keeping 
with her own personality and system of values 
and without conforming to society's 
expectation of what constitutes the 'normal' 
decision in this situation (if such a thing 
exists). As a capacitous individual C is, in 
respect of her own body and mind, sovereign.  
 
98. In circumstances where I have decided 
that C has at this time the capacity to make 
the decision in question, this court has no 
jurisdiction to interfere with the decision 
making process. Accordingly, although rightly 
brought, I dismiss the application of the Trust 
for declarations under the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005.  
 
99. As I said at the conclusion of this hearing, 
my decision that C has capacity to decide 
whether or not to accept dialysis does not, and 
should not prevent her treating doctors from 
continuing to seek to engage with C in an 
effort to persuade her of the benefits of 
receiving life saving treatment in accordance 
with their duty to C as their patient. My 
decision does no more than confirm that in 
law C is entitled to refuse the treatment 
offered to her for her benefit by her dedicated 
treating team. Nothing I have said prevents 
them from continuing to offer that 
treatment.” 
It was subsequently reported that C had died 
some days after the hearing but before the 




It is understandable perhaps that this case 
attracted significant media attention.    Standing 
back from it, however, it is primarily important 
for two reasons:  
 
1. As a very clear statement of the law 
relating to the assessment of capacity 
which was both admirably succinct and 
(with one exception noted below, 
admirably accurate);  
  
2. As a deeply sympathetic application of 
those principles to a real person viewed, 
above all, as a person.  It is therefore 
absolutely of a piece with the approach 
adopted by Peter Jackson J in Wye Valley 
(and indeed with that adopted by Hayden J 
in the Re N case discussed in this 
Newsletter).     
 
In its – frank – recognition at paragraph 94 of the 
fact that capacity assessment in complex cases 
such as this represents no more than the attempt 
to place a reasonable interpretation upon the 
information available, the case also stands as a 
reminder of:  
  
1. The difficulty of imposing a necessary 
‘binary’ black and white legal framework 
upon the realities of human beings; and 
therefore  
 
2. How careful assessors must be to make 
sure that they have obtained all the 
relevant information and seek to approach 
  
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter December 2015 
Compendium: COP Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty  
 
Click here for all our mental capacity resources                                         Page 15 of 54 
 
– insofar as possible – the person that they 
are assessing on that person’s own terms.   
 
The one area in which we would – respectfully – 
quibble with MacDonald J’s summary of the law is 
his assertion at paragraph 35 that a person seeking 
to prove that another lacks capacity has to show 
that they lack the capacity to both use and weigh 
the relevant information.   As discussed in greater 
detail in the guest note which follows prepared by 
Wayne Martin and Fabian Freyenhagen of the 
University of Essex, we would respectfully doubt 
that this in fact represents a correct statement of 
the law.  We should emphasise that we do not 
consider that applying the correct approach (i.e. 
that a person lacks the relevant capacity if they 
cannot either use or weigh the information) would 
have made any different on the facts of this 
particular case.  
 
It should be noted, finally, that MacDonald J 
appeared to take it as axiomatic that – at least in 
the case before him – it was necessary to approach 
the test for capacity on the basis of the functional 
aspect first (i.e. in line with the approach 
suggested by the Court of Appeal in PC, and 
contrary to the approach suggested in the Code of 
Practice).   Parker J in NCC doubted whether the 
Court of Appeal had in fact intended to reverse the 
two, and this case may well therefore re-open the 
debate.   As suggested in our guidance note on the 
assessment of mental capacity, the way through 
this debate may well be:  
 
1. To note that it may be a question of the 
focus upon the particular aspect of the test 
that is most relevant in the circumstances 
facing the assessor; and 
 
2. In all cases to ask the vital third question – 
whether the apparent inability to take the 
decision is because of the relevant 
impairment of or disturbance in the mind 
or brain.  
 
Use or Weigh?  or Use and Weigh? 
A Note on the Logic of MCA sec. 
3(1) 
 
[This guest note is prepared by Wayne Martin 
and Fabian Freyenhagen of the Essex Autonomy 
Project] 
 
In Kings College Hospital NHS Trust Foundation 
Trust v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80, MacDonald J 
made an observation, almost in passing, about 
the framing of the definition of mental capacity in 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).  The 
particular matter at issue concerns the logical 
relationship between the concepts of use and 
weigh as they figure in that definition.  It is not 
our purpose here to assess MacDonald J’s ruling 
in this important and difficult case, which is 
discussed elsewhere in this issue of The Mental 
Capacity Newsletter.  But on the particular point 
concerning the logic of the capacity test, we 
respectfully submit that MacDonald J’s analysis is 
incorrect.   
 
Rather than turning directly to MacDonald J’s 
analysis, we begin from the language of the 
statute itself.  As is well-known, the MCA relies on 
a functional definition of the notion of “decision-
making capacity.”  One quirk of the statute is that 
its definition of this central concept is negative:  
the relevant section of the statute defines not the 
possession but the absence of the ability to make 
a decision for oneself.  In particular, MCA sec. 
3(1) establishes that: 
For the purposes of section 2, a person is 
unable to make a decision for himself if he is 
unable—(a)  to understand the information 
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relevant to the decision, (b)  to retain that 
information, (c)  to use or weigh that 
information as part of the process of making 
the decision, or (d)  to communicate his 
decision (whether by talking, using sign 
language or any other means).  
The matter at issue for us here concerns the 
logical form of this definition.  Notice in particular 
that it is presented as a list of four functional 
abilities, but that the third of these has a 
disjunctive character:  to use or weigh 
information in making a decision.  MacDonald J’s 
logical observation concerned the significance of 
the logical connective: or. 
 
What should we make of the “or” in MCA sec. 
3(1)(c)?   Our own approach in answering this 
question begins with the observation that there 
are in fact two occurrences of the word “or” in 
the relevant clause.   One appears between the 
word “use” and the word “weigh”; the second 
appears at the end of the clause, serving as the 
logical connective linking 3(1)(c) to 3(1)(d).  In 
fact, we submit, there is an implicit “or” at work 
at each step in the functional definition.   In effect 
what it says is that a person lacks the ability to 
make a decision for themselves if and only if they 
either lack the ability to understand … , or lack the 
ability to retain … , or lack the ability to use … , or 
lack the ability to weigh … , or lack the ability to 
communicate.2   
                                                 
2
 These implicit occurrences of “or” can be seen explicitly 
in the original Law Commission draft of what was then 
called The Mental Incapacity Bill:   
For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person is 
at the material time unable to make a decision by 
reason of mental disability if the disability is such 
that at the time when the decision needs to be 
made – (a) he is unable to understand or retain the 
information relevant to the decision, including 
information about the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of deciding one way or another or of 
failing to make the decision; or (b) he is unable to 
Once again, it is worth keeping in mind that this 
disjunctive logical form appears in the context of 
statutory language that defines a negative trait 
(the inability to make a decision for oneself) in 
terms of the absence of certain psychological 
capacities.  If we turn that around in order to 
define the positive trait (the ability to make a 
decision for oneself) in terms of the possession of 
certain psychological capacities, then all these 
occurrences of “or” become so many occurrence 
of “and.”  A person has the ability to make a 
decision of themselves in a matter if they have 
the ability to understand … , and the ability to 
retain … , and the ability to use … , and the ability 
to weigh … , and the ability to communicate.  This 
transposition follows as a matter of logic.3  
Independent evidence in its support can be found 
in the Explanatory Notes that accompanied the 
MCA, which included just such a positive 
transposition of the statutory definition.  The 
                                                                                 
make a decision based on that information. (The 
Law Commission, Mental Incapacity Report LC No. 
231, page 223; emphasis added) 
It should be noted that the Law Commission report was 
drafted at a time when the common law definition of 
incapacity was being refined, coming as it did between the 
decisions in Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290 and Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 
426.  In the latter case, Lady Justice Butler-Sloss wrote that: 
 [The] inability to make a decision will occur when 
(a) the patient is unable to comprehend and retain 
the information which is material to the decision, 
especially as to the likely consequences of having 
or not having the treatment in question. (b) the 
patient is unable to use the information and weigh 
it in the balance as part of the process of arriving 
at the decision. … . (Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426, para. 
30.4., emphasis added.) 
In this passage from MB, the conjunctive form (“use and 
weigh”) is used in the context of a definition of the inability 
to make a decision.   It is important to note, however, that 
Lady Justice Butler-Sloss was not offering an interpretation 
of a statute adopted by Parliament, as there was not yet a 
statute to interpret.  
3
 Logically, the crucial theorem is (~p  (~q v ~r))  (p  
(q & r)).  That this formula is indeed a tautology can be 
proved by constructing a truth table. 
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relevant portion of the positive definition, which 
takes an explicitly conjunctive character, reads as 
follows.  
To make a decision, a person must first 
comprehend the information relevant to the 
decision … , secondly retain this information … 
and thirdly use and weigh it to arrive at a 
choice. If the person cannot undertake one of 
these three aspects of the decision-making 
process then he is unable to make the 
decision. 4 
On our reading, therefore, a person must have all 
five abilities (i.e. to be able to understand, retain, 
use, weigh, communicate) in order to pass the 
functional test for decision-making capacity.  
 
With all this in mind, then, let us consider 
MacDonald J’s recent ruling in the C case.  In 
para. 35, MacDonald J writes: 
In this case the Trust bases its submissions 
regarding the 'functional test' squarely on 
section 3(1)(c) of the 2005 Act, which provides 
that a person is unable to make a decision for 
himself if he is 'unable to…use or weigh' the 
relevant information as part of the process of 
making the decision (as the disjunctive 'or' 
comes after the negative, 'unable to' in s 
3(1)(c) the subsection requires the person 
asserting a lack of capacity to demonstrate an 
inability on the part of the individual to 
use and weigh the relevant information). 
On the analysis we have offered, this is not 
correct.  The requirement of MCA sec. 3(1)(c) can 
be satisfied either by establishing that a person is 
unable to use or by establishing that a person is 
unable to weigh.  One way of exhibiting the error 
in MacDonald J’s reasoning is to return to double 
                                                 
4
 Department of Health, 2005: Explanatory Notes to the 
Mental Capacity Act: emphasis altered.  See also the MCA’s 
Code of Practice, 4.21. 
occurrence of the word “or” in section 3(1)(c).  As 
we have seen, one occurrence links “use” and 
“weigh;” the second links section 3(1)(c) and 
section 3(1)(d).  Both occurrences come, as 
MacDonald J puts it, “after the negative, ‘unable 
to.’”  If we were to apply MacDonald J’s reasoning 
consistently, we would have to conclude that the 
person asserting a lack of capacity must 
demonstrate an inability to communicate as well 
as an inability to use/weigh.  Indeed, a proof of 
incapacity would have to establish that all five 
abilities are absent.  Since such a conclusion is 
plainly incorrect, we respectfully suggest that the 
principle informing MacDonald J’s interpretation 
of the first “or” in section 3(1)(c) cannot be 
accepted. 
 
Does any of this really matter?  Much depends, of 
course, on how the other words in MCA 3(1)(c) 
are interpreted.  What, in particular, is meant by 
the terms use and weigh?  If those two terms are 
effectively synonyms (or irredeemably ill-
defined), then it does not much matter whether 
they are linked conjunctively or disjunctively.  But 
if they are distinct concepts, then our 
interpretation of the functional test has the effect 
of setting the bar higher for decision-making 
capacity.  In order to have the ability to make a 
decision for oneself in a particular matter at the 
material time, a person must be able both to use 
and to weigh the information relevant to the 
decision.  Simply having one of the two abilities 
does not suffice.  Our own view, which we shall 
not seek to defend here, is that “use” is best 
understood as a broader category than “weigh.”  
A person can use information in a variety of 
different ways:  for example in hypothetical 
reasoning, in subsuming particular information 
under a general rule, or simply by paraphrasing 
information in their own words.  Weighing 
treatment information is a more specific 
deliberative task;  it characteristically involves 
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considering the pros and cons of different 
options in the process of reaching a decision.  On 
our understanding of MCA 3(1)(c), a capacity 
assessment should consider both a person’s 
broad ability to use information, and the more 
specific ability to “weigh up,” comparing the 
advantages and disadvantages of different 
options.5 
 
Medical treatment, the MCA and 
the MHA 
 
A Hospital NHS Trust v (1) CD (2) A Mental Health 
Trust [2015] EWCOP 74 (Mostyn J) 
 
Best interests – medical treatment – MHA 1983 – 




The issue in this case was whether it was in the 
best interests of a 43 year old woman, CD, who 
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia to have a 
total abdominal hysterectomy in circumstances 
where she lacked capacity to make that decision 
for herself.  
 
CD had an established diagnosis of schizoaffective 
disorder and was detained under section 3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983. Her illness had a 
remitting and relapsing course and her mental 
capacity had fluctuated in the past. She had a 
long history of aggression and violence. The 
evidence showed that CD’s delusional beliefs 
impaired her ability to weigh up the advantages 
and disadvantages of medical treatment. Mostyn 
J had no difficulty in finding that that CD 
manifestly lacked capacity to make the relevant 
decision.  
 
                                                 
5
 We wish to thank Alex Ruck Keene for his assistance in the 
preparation of this note. 
The object of the surgery was to remove two very 
large ovarian growths or masses. All the medical 
experts and all the parties, including the Official 
Solicitor who represented CD, agreed that it was 
in CD’s best interests to have the operation. CD 
strongly expressed the wish to have the 
operation. Based on the totality of the medical 
evidence, and on CD’s wishes and feelings, 
Mostyn J concluded that it was in CD’s best 
interests that the operation must take place.  
 
Ancillary to the operation taking place, it was 
necessary for Mostyn J to authorise a deprivation 
of CD’s liberty which engaged the difficult 
interface between the MHA and MCA. The 
question was whether CD was ineligible to be 
deprived of her liberty because the surgical 
removal of the ovarian masses was not in 
accordance with the MHA regime. There were 
two ways of reading this which gave rise to 
directly contradictory results. Mostyn J adopted a 
purposive (rather than literal) reading of 
paragraph 3(2) to schedule 1A to the MCA which 
permitted him to make the orders sitting in the 
Court of Protection under the MCA rather than in 
the High Court exercising power under the 
common law inherent jurisdiction. As an aside, 
Mostyn J commented that it was 
“counterintuitive” that someone going freely and 
enthusiastically to hospital to have an operation 
performed under general anaesthesia was 
deprived of her liberty. However, as it was not a 
decision that CD could make, and if she changed 
her mind she would be operated on nonetheless, 
Mostyn J was satisfied that the state of affairs fell 
within the acid test in Cheshire West (as to which 




Following on from the recent and moving 
judgment in Wye Hospital NHS Trust v B [2015] 
EWCOP 60, Mr Justice Mostyn concentrated on 
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CD’s own wishes and feelings. However, he 
emphasised “it is vital that wishes and feelings 
are strictly confined to the best interests analysis 
and do not act subtly to undermine a capacity 
assessment. Where, as here, there is no doubt 
about incapacity when the wishes and feelings of 
the protected person cannot alter that fact even if 
they happen to align exactly with a rational, 
“capacitous”, decision.”   
 
In reaching his conclusion on CD’s deprivation of 
liberty, Mostyn J reaffirmed the purposive and 
pragmatic approach in his earlier decision of An 
NHS Trust v A [2015] EWCOP 761 reported briefly 
upon in our November newsletter. This puts 
another nail in the coffin for Re AB [2015] EWCOP 
31 where a contrary approach was taken.  
 
Readers with a classical education (or ready 
access to Google Translate) will no doubt 
appreciate Mostyn J’s observations as to the 
views of hoplites as to the meaning of deprivation 
of liberty.  
 
Constrained choice can be true 
choice  
 
MM v WL Clinic and MHS [2015] UKUT 0644 
(AAC) UT (AAC) (Charles J) 
 





The patient was 32 years old with a diagnosis of 
mild learning disability, autistic spectrum disorder 
and pathological fire starting. Convicted of arson, 
the Crown Court imposed a restricted hospital 
order (MHA ss37/41). He sought a conditional 
discharge on the basis that his capacitous 
consent to a care regime in the community would 
render lawful what would otherwise be a 
deprivation of his liberty. 
 
The crux of the appeal was whether the threat of 
recall to hospital from the community meant that 
the patient’s consent was not free and therefore 
invalid. Applying his analysis and obiter 
comments in Secretary of State for Justice v KC 
and C Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2015] 
UKUT 0376 (AAC), Charles J held that:  
“63. The points made in paragraphs 56 to 62 
above, show that conditions relating to a 
placement outside a hospital which when 
implemented will create on an objective 
assessment a deprivation of liberty: 
 
i) cannot be lawfully imposed on a 
restricted patient under the MHA,  
 
ii) can be part of the terms and conditions of 
a conditional discharge that is, or which a 
restricted patient can reasonably 
conclude is, in his best interests because 
it is the least restrictive option and one 
that enables him to demonstrate that (a) 
it is no longer necessary for him to be in 
hospital or liable to recall to hospital to 
receive treatment for a mental disorder 
for the purposes set out in the MHA and 
so that (b) he should be given an absolute 
discharge, 
 
iii) can promote the underlying purposes of 
the MHA and a conditional discharge (see 
paragraphs 85 to 89 of my decision in the 
KC case), and 
 
iv) can only be made a lawful option or 
alternative for a capacitous restricted 
patient if he gives a valid consent to it.  
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i) a capacitous restricted patient (like the 
Court of Protection or a DOLS decision 
maker in respect of a restricted patient 
who lacks the relevant capacity) has a 
real choice founded on the advantages 
and disadvantages and so the merits of 
the proposed placement assessed 
through the eyes of the restricted patient 
to consent to such conditions, and that  
 
ii) any such decision is most unlikely to be 
driven by a threat that he might be 
recalled to hospital.   
 
 
This is because he is not being presented with 
a choice between two alternatives that can be 
imposed on him and the driver for his consent 
would be a move from hospital (albeit one 
that might end with an imposed recall) to a 
placement outside hospital which he has 
concluded is in his best interests because, for 
example, in his view that would be a step 
towards his absolute discharge into the 
community.” 
Accordingly, the patient’s consent to the 
proposed conditional discharge arrangements 
meant that he would forego his Article 5 right and 




The decision in KC enabled those lacking capacity 
to be lawfully discharged from hospital into a 
community deprivation of liberty. This eminently 
sensible decision enables those with capacity to 
similarly do so where they consent to the 
arrangements. Both decisions appear to settle 
the law, but where does this leave the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Secretary of State for Justice 
v RB [2012] 1 MHLR 131? Doubts may linger 
unless and until that decision is put to bed by the 
appeal courts. As Charles J noted at paragraph 8, 
“… as a matter of good administration, the 
Secretary of State should “put up or shut up…” as 
regards his position relating to patients in this 
position (as to which see further, perhaps, the 
response to No Voice Unheard outlined in the 
Capacity outside the Court of Protection 
Newsletter).   
 
Capacity, marriage and consent  
 
Luton Borough Council v (1) SB (2) RS (by his 
litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) [2015] 





RS was a 25 year old man with an intellectual 
disability and autism spectrum disorder. He lived 
with his mother (SB) and six of his seven siblings.  
 
Proceedings were commenced by the local 
authority seeking a Forced Marriage Protection 
Order. The application was designed to forestall 
an anticipated marriage. However, it 
subsequently transpired that a marriage between 
RS and W had taken place in Pakistan. The 
proceedings were reconstituted under the 
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.  
 
The issues included:  
 
 Did RS lack capacity to consent to 
marriage?  
 Did RS lack capacity to consent to sexual 
relations? 
 If RS lacked capacity to consent to 
marriage and/or sexual relations, should 
the court exercise its discretion under the 
inherent jurisdiction to make a 
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declaration that the marriage was not 
recognised at English law?  
 
Applying the tests in Re M (An Adult) (Capacity to 
Consent to Sexual Relations) [2015] Fam 61, and 
Re E (An alleged patient): Sheffield City Council v E 
[2005] 1 FLR 965, to the facts, Hayden J had little 
difficulty concluding that RS lacked capacity to 
marry and consent to sexual relations, and that 
there was no real prospect of RS gaining the 
capacity.  
 
Following his findings that RS lacked capacity to 
consent to marriage and sexual relations, Hayden 
J was invited to make a declaration of non-
recognition of the Pakistani marriage. Hayden J 
gave careful consideration to various competing 
interests. In respect of M, he said:  
“Having heard all the evidence in this case I 
am convinced that the objective of this 
marriage was to provide RS with care and 
security for the remainder of his life. M, in 
particular, had been shocked and disturbed by 
her son's isolation and unhappiness in the 
residential unit. She found it difficult to 
manage her distress as she told me about this 
period in her son's life. As the records at the 
time reveal, even then, M contemplated 
marriage as a solution for her son's 
predicament. I think that she considered the 
options for her son's future and found them, 
by the standards of her hopes and 
expectations as a mother, to be bleak.” 
In respect of W, Hayden J said:  
“In her evidence to me W was respectful to the 
family, to her husband and to the Court. I 
formed the impression that she had made a 
utilitarian calculation of her own interests in 
this marriage. From a purely western 
perspective that might appear to be a critical 
observation. I do not intend it to be regarded 
as such. W has different cultural expectations; 
social priorities which are influenced by her 
upbringing in Kashmir and by her own 
understandings of the responsibilities and 
obligations expected of women in her society. 
She was articulate in her assertion that she 
had entered this marriage of her own free will. 
Despite the highly personal nature of the 
inevitable and proper questions she confirmed 
with some robustness, that the marriage had 
been consummated. She also told me that at 
the time of her menstruation her new husband 
had shown sensitivity and forbearance. In 
short, I have absolutely no sense that she had 
entered this marriage under duress or in 
consequence of any abusive pressure. On her 
part I am entirely satisfied that she gave free 
consent.” 
However, the decisive factor in granting the 
declaration sought was RS’s inability to consent. 
Hayden J said:  
“Ultimately however, I have come to the 
conclusion that capacity, at least in the 
circumstances here, is an intrinsic, indivisible 
facet of both psychological and moral 
integrity. The absence of RS's capacity to 
consent either to sexual relations or to 
marriage ultimately compromises the ability of 
this couple to forge the mutual and reciprocal 
commitment which, in my judgement, is an 
essential component of a marriage, perhaps 
even universally so.”  
Comment 
 
This judgment demonstrates a careful and 
sensitive application of the law to the facts. 
Hayden J echoed the words of Mostyn in D 
Borough Council v B [2011] EWCOP 101 where he 
said that the restriction of sexual relationship 
engages a very profound aspect of an individual’s 
civil liberties and personal autonomy, and 
recognised “the development of psychological 
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and moral integrity and relationships with other 
human beings as key aspects of individual human 
rights.” Although granting the declaration of non-
recognition, and expressing the view that in most 
cases the court will be required to make a 
declaration of non-recognition, Hayden J made 
clear that there may be circumstances in the 
interests of justice, fairness and respect of 
individual autonomy where discretion could be 
exercised against any such declaration.  
  
Article 5 and conditions of 
detention  
 
R (on the application of Idira) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1187 
(Court of Appeal (Master of the Rolls, The 
President of the Queen’s Bench Division, and 
Lord Justice McCombe)) 
 




This case, from the immigration context, 
concerns a claim for unlawful detention contrary 
to Article 5(1) ECHR.  
 
The appellant was an Algerian national whose 
leave to remain in the UK had expired. He was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for theft 
and sent to a prison. Once the custodial part of 
his sentence was over, he remained in prison 
before being moved to an immigration detention 
centre. The issue was whether the applicant’s 
continued detention in a prison, rather than an 
immigration removal centre, was unlawful and in 
breach of his rights under article 5(1).  
 
The Court of Appeal, interpreting the authorities, 
reached the view that the task of the national 
court is to decide whether the place and 
conditions of detention are suitable and 
appropriate. In this particular context, the Court 
of Appeal held that immigration detention in a 
prison rather than an immigration removal centre 
was not generally contrary to article 5(1).  
 
Comment 
This case is interesting for what it says about the 
conditions of detention under Article 5(1). The 
appropriateness of place and conditions are 
relevant criteria for determining whether 
detention is arbitrary. This reasoning applies 
equally to detention in the context of, for 
example, a care home or hospital setting, under 
Article 5(1)(e) (lawful detention of persons of 
unsound mind).  Indeed, in reaching its 
conclusion on the law, the Court of Appeal 
referred to a number of Article 5(1)(e) cases 
including Ashingdale v United Kingdom(1985) 7 
EHRR 528. In that case, the European Court of 
Human Rights made clear that “there must be 
some relationship between the ground of 
permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the 
place and conditions of detention. In principle, the 
“detention” of a person as a mental health 
patient will only be “lawful” for the purposes of 
sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1 if effected in a 
hospital, clinic, or other appropriate institution 
authorised for that purpose…” The Article 5 
obligation to ensure that the place and conditions 
of detention are suitable and appropriate chimes 
with a basic principle in the MCA that, in making 
arrangements for a deprivation of liberty, regard 
must be had to whether it can be achieved in a 
way that is less restrictive of P’s rights and 
freedoms.  
 
Short Note: St George’s and the 
powers of the court 
 
Newton J has authorised the publication of the 
order he made in St George’s Healthcare NHS 
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Trust v P & Q [2015] EWCOP 42 (discussed 
here).  The order makes clear what we had 
suspected must have been the case (but was 
made inadvertently ambiguous in the judgment), 
namely that he did not order the Trust to 
continue providing P with renal replacement 
therapy; rather he declared that it was lawful 
(being in his best interests) for him to continue 
receiving it.   Had Newton J ordered the Trust to 
continue providing such treatment, that would 
have represented a very significant step over the 
well-respected dividing line between the roles of 
the court and clinicians.  For those who want to 
read more about this, an article by Alex should be 
appearing in the next issue of the Medical Law 
Review.   
Establishing necessity in 
deprivation of liberty – Strasbourg 
speaks again  
 
Hadžimejlić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina  
(Application no 3427/13) ECtHR (Fourth Section) 
 





Three citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
deprived of their legal capacity and deprived of 
their liberty in a social care home because their 
families were not prepared to take care of them 
and they needed social assistance. The 
Constitutional Court had previously decided that 
this breached Articles 5(1) and 5(4) because such 
psychiatric detention had to be authorised by a 
decision of the civil courts and there was a lack of 
judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention. 
When the deprivation of liberty was reviewed, 
the relevant civil court decided that their state of 
health did not warrant continued confinement in 
the care home. However, they were not released 
because their continued placement was 
considered to be in their best interests for 
reasons of social protection. 
 
The ECtHR repeated its well-rehearsed principles 
regarding Article 5(1)(e), cited the 2007 report of 
the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture etc (which criticised the process of 
admission to social care homes in the country), 
and referred to Articles 14 and 19 of the CRPD as 
well as Recommendation No. Rec(2004)10. In 
light of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the 
ECtHR had no difficulty in concluding that there 
had been a breach of Article 5(1) in not securing 





This is another ECtHR decision that confirms that 
deprivation of liberty in a care home can only be 
justified if the unsoundness of mind is of a kind or 
degree to warrant it. Sadly missing from the 
judgment are details as to what less restrictive 
alternatives to the care home were available. The 
Constitutional Court had ordered the social work 
centre (which placed them there) to “take 
measures to ensure respect for the applicants’ 
rights” under Article 5. The government 
contended that their continued placement was in 
their best interests. However, the ECtHR took the 
unusual step of ruling that the State “must secure 
… release from the Drin social care home without 
further delay”. Perhaps such muscular flexing of 
the Article 5 protection in the absence of 
concrete alternatives demonstrates the 
paramountcy of physical security.    
 
BIA Time Survey 
 
In July 2015 Cornwall Council DoLS team started a 
BIA Time Survey looking at how long DOLS 
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assessments take. The link to the report is now 
available here.  The headline finding is that The 
average time taken per DOLS assessment by the 
507 respondents to this survey is 12.1 hours, but 
we would recommend that the full study is read 
carefully to see precisely how the assessors in 
question approached their tasks. 
 
Emma Goodall and Paul Wilkins are to be 
congratulated on undertaking a really valuable 
piece of work which gives an actual evidence 
base upon which to build policies in the future.    
 
CQC 6th annual report on 
monitoring DOLS 
 
The 6th annual reporting on monitoring DOLS is 
now available. 
 
The key findings are reproduced below. 
There has been a tenfold rise in Deprivation of 
Liberty Safeguards applications in 2014/15 
 
Since their introduction in 2009, numbers of 
applications to use the Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards were consistently low. However, 
this changed in March 2014 following the 
ruling of the Supreme Court which clarified the 
test for when people are deprived of their 
liberty. Since then, applications have increased 
tenfold from 13,715 in the year ending March 
2014 to 137,540 by March 2015. 
 
Providers’ use of the Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards is variable 
 
Through our inspections in 2014/15, we found 
that staff training and awareness of the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards varies across 
providers, as do the existence and 
implementation of policies and processes. We 
found examples where some providers may be 
unlawfully depriving people of their liberty. 
Improvement is needed across the health and 
social care sector 
 
We believe that the current pressures on the 
system are unsustainable. We welcome the 
Law Commission’s consideration on the 
process for authorising deprivations of liberty 
and await its final proposals for reforming the 
system. It is also important that providers and 
local authorities follow the current legislation 
and Codes of Practice to the Mental Capacity 
Act and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
to ensure that people’s rights are protected. 
 
We will continue to monitor the response of 
providers and the wider system going forward. 
We will continue to use our inspections and 
reports to encourage improvements in 
practice, and challenge providers if they are 
not meeting legislative requirements which 
may include taking enforcement action. 
There is also a useful – and revealing – map 
indicating visually just how rates of applications 
vary across England and Wales.   
 
In the body of their report, the CQC give their 
initial reaction to the Law Commission’s 
provisional proposals thus: 
We agree that the proposed ‘protective care’ 
scheme should better serve the needs of 
people affected, and provide a better 
framework for their families and 
representatives to become involved in the care 
being offered. However, we are concerned 
that some aspects of the current proposals are 
complex, and may not be easily understood by 
everyone who will be affected by them, 
including those involved in their 
implementation. We look forward to the Law 
Commission’s recommendations for reform 
after they have considered the consultation 
feedback. A draft Bill is expected to be 
published in 2016 
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The CQC recommend, in the interim, that “[l]ocal 
authorities must not advise providers to delay or 
inappropriately minimise their applications as this 
increases the likelihood of people being unlawfully 
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Gratuitous care and deputies 
 
Re HNL [2015] EWCOP 77 (Senior Judge Lush)  
 




In this case Senior Judge Lush had to consider the 
issue of gratuitous care allowances paid to lay 
deputies or members of P’s family. 
 
The deputy in this case was P’s brother and had 
been appointed receiver in relation to P’s clinical 
negligence damages award before the MCA came 
into effect. 
 
When appointed, Master Lush (as he then was) 
authorised a gratuitous care allowance to be paid 
to the receiver for his care and case management 
services in the sum of £23,000 per year. That 
payment continued after the receiver became 
the deputy. 
 
The Public Guardian required the deputy to apply 
to court for retrospective authorisation of the 
payments and an order permitting further 
payments on the ground that such payments 
were not permitted by section 19(7) MCA. The 
Senior Judge agreed that such authorisation was 
needed as section 19(7) only allows 
reimbursement of deputies for performing 
deputy’s functions as such, see paragraph 41. 
 
The Senior Judge authorised all past payments 
and directed a case manager’s report into future 
payments. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the extent of P’s disabilities, 
the report concluded that a professional case 
manager would charge far more than was being 
paid to the deputy. Thus, the payments were 
authorised for the future with the option of 
indexation, see paragraphs 50 and 51. He also 
provide for review in 2022, see paragraph 55. 
 
So far as the amount of such payments is 
concerned, the Senior Judge reiterated that the 
Court of Protection approaches that in the same 
way as does the court in a damages claim, namely 
to ascertain the commercial value and discount it 
by 20% to reflect the fact that the payment is tax 
and NI free, see paragraphs 37 – 39. 
 
The Senior Judge emphasised that a deputy must 
apply for authority to pay himself a care 
allowance, see paragraphs 43 and 44. He also 
stated that if a lay deputy wished to pay such an 
allowance to a family member the court must 
authorise this too, see paragraph 44. 
 
Finally, he noted that professional deputies are 
now being required by the OPG to seek 
authorisation of such allowances when made to 
P’s family (seemingly as part of a general review 
of such payments). He stated that he had had a 
meeting with the OPG to discuss this issue in the 
light of the administrative and financial burden 
that such applications would cause. The result of 
this will soon be published. See paragraphs 3, 52, 




The decision in this case is uncontroversial; the 
position currently being adopted by the OPG is 
more so.   We await with interest news of 
whether this policy will continue in light of the 
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Managing conflicts of interest 
 
Re JW [2015] EWCOP 82 (Senior Judge Lush)  
 




In this case Senior Judge Lush had to consider the 
issue of who should be P’s deputy, P’s son or the 
local authority authorised officer. 
 
The local authority authorised officer was the 
existing deputy and the matter started as the 
son’s application to be a joint deputy. 
Unfortunately, the local authority stated that 
they would not agree to being a joint deputy in 
any circumstances (as a matter of policy not 
anything to do with the applicant or P’s 
situation). That led to the son amending his 
application so that he should replace the local 
authority authorised officer and be sole deputy. 
 
The Senior Judge eventually decided that it was in 
P’s best interests that her son be her sole deputy 
and the importance of this case does not concern 
that part of the decision. 
 
One of the grounds put forward by the local 
authority for opposing the amended application 
was that the son was in a position of conflict of 
interest as he proposed that P’s house (where 
she no longer lived) should be renovated before 
sale and he (being a builder) should carry out the 
project. Thus, said the local authority, he stood to 
gain from his deputyship. 
 
The Senior Judge accepted that but pointed out 
that potential conflicts of interest were endemic 
and included local authorities when they were 
providing care and assessing contributions, see 
paragraphs 28 – 49 where there is a very useful 
survey of the law in in both its historical context 
and the context of Article 12(4) CRPD.   
 
The court’s task was to manage any inevitable 
conflict of interest and in this case the Senior 
Judge made detailed provisions as to how the son 





It is clear that Senior Judge Lush is particularly 
interested in working through some of the 
practical implications of Article 12(4) of the 
UNCRPD and, in particular, what securing against 
undue influence and conflicts of interest in 
relation to the exercise of legal capacity actually 
means.    One gets the impression that 
paragraphs 28-49 of the judgment were intended 
to have a rather wider (and indeed different) 
audience than either the local authority or P’s 
son. 
The OPG publishes its new 
Safeguarding Policy 
 
On 1st December, the OPG released its new 
Safeguarding Policy dated November 2015. 
 
Of particular relevance in the area of property 
and affairs is section 11 that sets out some 
particular signs of potential financial abuse. 
Section 16 also has a useful summary of some of 
the circumstances when the OPG can and cannot 
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Fact-finding – when (and when not) 
to undertake it  
 
Re AG [2015] EWCOP 78 (Sir James Munby P) 
 





Sir James Munby P has given important guidance 
as to when (and when not) to hold a fact-finding 
hearing.  
 
The context of the decision is one that is – sadly – 
not altogether unfamiliar. It concerned a young 
woman, AG, with a moderate learning disability 
and autism spectrum disorder.     She alternated 
between living in her own property and living 
with her mother, DG, in respect of whom there 
were a number of allegations by AG (and others), 
but in respect of whom no conclusive findings 
had been reached in the context of safeguarding 
investigations.  In November 2011, after a 
number of allegations relating to both AG and her 
mother the local authority with responsibility for 
AG moved her into a placement at a care home 
(no prior order having been sought from the 
Court of Protection).   The local authority applied 
shortly after the move to the Court of Protection 
for declarations and decisions as to AG’s welfare 
and best interests.   By the time of the final 
hearing, DG had moved into semi-independent 
living.   A final order was made granting the relief 
sought by the local authority, including 
supervision of contact between AG and her 
mother.  
 
DG appealed on four grounds, the major thrust 
being that the judge, HHJ Rogers, failed to make 
findings of fact in relation to the events in 2011 
that had triggered the proceedings.    
 
In relation to this ground, Sir James Munby P 
expressly endorsed the pre-MCA 2005 decision of 
Wall J (as he then was) in Re S (Adult's Lack of 
Capacity: Care and Residence) [2003] EWHC 1909 
(Fam), in which he had emphasised that unlike in 
the case of care proceedings in relation to a child, 
there is no requirement to establish 'threshold' in 
the case of proceedings in relation to an adult, 
whether the proceedings are brought in the High 
Court under the inherent jurisdiction or, as here, 
in the Court of Protection, such that the absence 
of any threshold criteria equivalent to those 
contained in section 31 of the Children Act 1989, 
“raises the question as to the extent to which (if 
at all) it is necessary, for the purposes of 
exercising the jurisdiction and deciding which 
course of action is in the best interests of S, to 
make findings of fact relating in particular to 
disputed historical issues.”  Sir James Munby P 
expressly endorsed the answer given by Wall J at 
paragraphs 18 and 21 of that decision, namely 
that:  
"18 … I agree that there must be good reason 
for local authority intervention in a case such 
as the present. Equally, if there are disputed 
issues of fact which go to the question of Mr 
S's capacity and suitability to care for S, the 
court may need to resolve them if their 
resolution is necessary to the decision as to 
what is in S's best interests. Findings of fact 
against Mr S on the two issues identified in 
para [16] would plainly reflect upon his 
capacity properly to care for S. But it does not 
follow, in my judgment, that the proceedings 
must be dismissed simply because the factual 
basis upon which the local authority instituted 
them turns out to be mistaken, or because it 
cannot be established on the balance of 
probabilities. What matters (assuming always 
that mental incapacity is made out) is which 
outcome will be in S's best interests. There will 
plainly be cases which are very fact specific. 
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There will be others in which the principal 
concern is the future, and the relative 
suitability of the plans which each party can 
put forward for both the short and long-term 
care of the mentally incapable adult. The 
instant case, in my judgment, is one of the 
cases in the latter category. 
 
21 Whilst I acknowledge that in a relatively 
untried jurisdiction there are dangers in too 
relaxed an approach to historical issues, I am 
unable to accept the proposition that the 
approach to best interests is fettered in any 
way beyond that which applies to any judicial 
decision, namely that it has to be evidence 
based; that it excludes irrelevant material; and 
that it includes a consideration of all relevant 
material. In a field as complex as care for the 
mentally disabled, a high degree of 
pragmatism seems to me inevitable. But in 
each case it seems to me that the four 
essential building blocks are the same. First, is 
mental incapacity established? Secondly, is 
there a serious, justiciable issue relating to 
welfare? Thirdly, what is it? Fourthly, with the 
welfare of the incapable adult as the court's 
paramount consideration, what are the 
balance sheet factors which must be drawn up 
to decide which course of action is in his or her 
best interests?” 
Sir James Munby P held that the decisions of 
McFarlane J in A County Council v DP, RS, BS (By 
the Children's Guardian) [2005] EWHC 1593 
(Fam) and in Re W (Care Proceedings) [2008] 
EWHC 1118 (Fam), and the decision of Cobb J in 
LBX v TT (By the Official Solicitor as her Litigation 
Friend), MJ, WT, LT [2014] EWCOP 24, had to be 
read in light of the “overarching principles” 
identified by Wall J.   
 
On the facts of the instant case and, in particular, 
given that HHJ Rogers was careful to spell out the 
consequences of there having been no fact 
finding hearing (in particular that he did not “hold 
them in the background as it were by way of a 
suspicion lurking over DG”), Sir James Munby P 
had little hesitation in dismissing the appeal.     
 
The case is also of some note for confirming that 
where there is no new evidence (whether by way 
of expert evidence or observable events), there is 
no need for a judge to return to a determination 
of capacity made (in the present case) over a year 
previously before making a final order: see 
paragraph 17.  
 
Finally, and returning to a consistent theme, Sir 
James Munby P noted that:   
“56. Ms Khalique submits, and I am inclined to 
agree, that the local authority acted 
unlawfully in removing AG from OG in 
November 2011 and placing her at HH without 
having first obtained judicial sanction. Local 
authorities must seek and obtain appropriate 
judicial authority before moving an 
incapacitous adult from their home into other 
accommodation. Local authorities do not 
themselves have power to do this.  
 
57. Local authorities also need to appreciate 
and take appropriate steps to minimise the 
understandable distress and anger caused to 
someone in DG's position when initial relief is 
obtained from the court on the basis of 
allegations which are not thereafter pursued.” 
Comment 
 
Alex is somewhat reassured by this case because 
it represents endorsement of precisely the 
approach identified in the Court of Protection 
Handbook (which provides a neat opportunity to 
highlight that a revised first edition including the 
updated rules is now available).  
 
More seriously, the approach set out by the 
President undoubtedly represents the correct 
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way in which to proceed in cases where the key 
focus must be upon P and the factual basis upon 
which the court is being invited to make decisions 
about P.   Only where it is necessary to make 
findings of fact in order to make those decisions 
should the court embark upon such a fact-finding 
procedure.  
 
The only caveat that we would note is that whilst 
it is undoubtedly correct that the court does not 
apply a threshold akin to s.31 Children Act 1989, 
it is a very salutary exercise for local authorities 
considering making applications to the Court of 
Protection for what are the functional equivalent 
of adult care orders to proceed as if it does.    
 
In other words, applying the same forensic rigour 
as would be applied were a care order to be 
sought in respect of a child will – we suggest – 
ensure that elementary steps are taken to ensure 
that there is proper, substantiated, evidence 
upon which to seek orders which will have the 
effect of interfering dramatically with the rights 
of P and (frequently) those close to them.    As 
Hedley J recognised in LBB v JM, BK and CM 
[2010] COPLR Con Vol 779:  
“7. The local authority took the view that since 
the intervention of the court would engage a 
potential breach of the Article 8 rights of the 
parties, that it may be incumbent upon them 
to establish on a factual basis why it was that 
the court’s jurisdiction should be exercised. 
Broadly speaking, I would endorse that 
approach and recognise that where an Article 
8.2 justification is required then the case 
should not be dealt with purely as a welfare 
case if there are significant factual issues 
between the parties which might bear on the 
outcome of the consideration under Article 8.2 
as to whether state intervention was justified. 
 
8. The Mental Capacity Act does not contain 
provisions equivalent to the threshold 
provisions under s.31.2 of the Children Act. 
Nor should any such provisions be imported in 
it as clearly Parliament intended that they 
should not be, but an intervention with 
parties’ rights under Article 8 is a serious 
intervention by the state which requires to be 
justified under Article 8.2. If there is a 
contested factual basis it may often be right, 
as undoubtedly it was in this case, that that 
should investigated and determined by the 
court.” 
In other words, if local authorities (or indeed 
other public authorities) proceed on the basis 
that they need to be prepared – if needs be – to 
establish any and allegations made as to the risks 
faced by P (whether from others or from 
themselves), many of the car-crashes recently 
seen in the Court of Protection can be avoided.  
 
Short Note: ‘Urgency’ and the 
cross-border jurisdiction of the 
Court of Protection  
 
In Re J [2015] UKSC 70, the Supreme Court has 
considered Hague 34 (or, as family law 
practitioners call it, the 1996 Hague Convention 
on the Protection of Children) for the first time.    
The decision is relevant to those concerned with 
cross-border cases before the Court of Protection 
because of how Lady Hale (giving the judgment of 
the court) approached the construction of Article 
11 of Hague 34.   In all cases of urgency, this 
article gives jurisdiction to the authorities of the 
Contracting State in whose territory the child or 
property belonging to the child is present have 
jurisdiction to take any necessary measures of 
protection, which will lapse as soon as the 
authority with primary jurisdiction have taken the 
measures required by the situation (or where 
measures taken by a non-Contracting State 
where the child is habitually resident have been 
recognised and enforced). 
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A materially identical provision appears in Article 
11 appears also in Article 10 of Hague 34’s 
younger brother, Hague 35 (i.e. the 2000 
Convention on the International Protection of 
Adults), with an additional requirement that the 
state that has taken the measures inform, if 
possible, the authorities of the state of the adult’s 
habitual residence.    There are other (for these 
purposes irrelevant) limits on the circumstances 
under which Article 11 of Hague 34 can be 
invoked which do not apply in relation to Article 
10.   
 
Bringing matters closer to home, despite the fact 
that (unlike Hague 34) the UK has not ratified 
Hague 35 in respect of England and Wales, the 
provisions of Article 10 find their way into English 
law by way of paragraph 7(1)(c) of Schedule 3 to 
the MCA 2005, which provides that the Court of 
Protection may exercise its functions under the 
Act (in so far as it cannot otherwise do so) in 
relation to an adult present in England and Wales 
or who has property there, if the matter is 
urgent.  This is clearly the statutory 
implementation into English law of the provisions 
of Article 10(1) of Hague 35.    The Court of 
Protection is bound to seek to interpret the term 
‘urgency’ in Paragraph 7(1)(c) in line with the 
meaning given in Hague 35 given the 
requirement in paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 3 to 
construe expressions appearing in the Schedule 
and in Hague 35 in accordance with the 
Convention.  It is important to recall that the – 
deeply curious – wording of the MCA means that 
the CoP exercises its cross-border jurisdiction on 
an ‘all-comers’ basis, regardless of whether or 
not the other relevant state is a Contracting State 
to Hague 35.   When Hague 35 is ratified in 
respect of England and Wales, then, as between 
Contracting States, the provisions of paragraph 7 
will have to be read subject to paragraph 8 
(which will then give effect to the provisions of 
Article 10 in particular as regards the lapsing of 
such urgent measures where the state of primary 
jurisdiction has taken the necessary measures); 
this will not alter the position vis-à-vis non-
Contracting States or the interpretation of 
paragraph 7(1)(c).      
 
Lady Hale made clear in relation to Article 11 of 
Hague 34 (and hence – by analogy – with the 
position that should prevail in relation to the 
COP) that there is no pre-condition to the 
exercise of jurisdiction that it be impossible for 
the court of the home jurisdiction to take action.   
As she made clear at paragraphs 33-4, the 
‘holistic’ approach to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction demanded by Article 11 (and hence 
by paragraph 7(1)(c) of Schedule to the MCA) 
means that measures of protection which the 
individual needs now should not be delayed, 
provided they are in support of rather than in 
opposition to the jurisdiction of the home 
country, as the jurisdiction is a secondary, rather 
than a primary jurisdiction.   
 
Lady Hale also emphasised that, whilst that 
approach did not emerge from either the 
Explanatory Report to Hague 34 of Professor Paul 
Lagarde in 1996 or from the Practical Handbook 
on the operation of the 1996 Convention (a 
Handbook to which there is no equivalent under 
Hague 35), these texts should not be treated as if 
they were words in the Convention.   Previous 
judges have expressed similar caution in treating 
Explanatory Reports as quasi-statutory (see, in 
particular, R v R (Residence Order: Child 
Abduction) [1995] Fam 209, concerning the 
Report accompanying the 1980 Convention, in 
which Stuart-Smith J held that “whilst no doubt 
the report is a permissible, useful and indeed 
authoritative aid to construction of the 
Convention if the language of the Convention is 
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unclear, on this point [Article 16] it seems to me 
that the language of the Convention is perfectly 
clear – indeed distinctly clearer than that of the 
report.”)   There may well in due course be cases 
before the Court of Protection where similar 
caution may need to be exercised in relation to 
the report accompanying Hague 35.  
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DNACPR notices – applying the 
principles  
 
Elaine Winspear v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS 
Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 3250 (QB) High 
Court (QBD) (Blake J) 
 






Carl Winspear was twenty-eight years old when 
he died shortly after 11.00 pm on the 3 January 
2011.  He had suffered all his life from cerebral 
palsy, epilepsy, spinal deformities and other 
associated health conditions. At the time of his 
death and all other relevant times he lacked 
capacity within the meaning of the MCA 2005.   
Carl had been unwell for a few days beforehand 
and suffered from chest infections. He was 
admitted to his local hospital on 2 January 2011 
around 3.00 pm.   His mother, Elaine, stayed with 
Carl from his arrival at the hospital until about 
9.00pm. When she left she had no particular 
concern for his future.  Before she went to bed 
that night she contacted the hospital around 
10.00pm and was told that Carl was the same.  
 
In the middle of the night, a specialist registrar 
placed on Carl’s clinical record a notice to the 
effect that cardio-pulmonary resuscitation should 
not be attempted (DNACPR).  This was done 
without consultation with Ms Winspear or any 
other family member or person representing 
Carl’s interests. The registrar recorded in Carl's 
medical record “DNAR. Speak to family in the 
morning.” The printed DNACPR notice itself was 
not fully filled in; the sections dealing with the 
date of order, with whom the decision was 
discussed and the counter signature by the 
consultant were not completed. The decision was 
to last 48 hours.    
 
The registrar made the decision regarding the 
placement of the DNACPR notice on clinical 
grounds as a result of information he had about 
Carl's condition. He noted that Carl had cerebral 
palsy, limited communication and was bed-
bound. He had pyrexia and hypoxia on arrival at 
A&E; he had a severally deformed spine 
(kyphosis); it was considered that he was likely to 
be suffering pneumonia and was in a frail state. 
He concluded that CPR would be inappropriate in 
the event of a cardiac arrest because Carl's 
severe kyphosis and contractures in his arm made 
effective performance of it impossible.   
 
In a subsequent witness statement the registrar 
explained that that he did not want to inflict on 
Carl a treatment that was distressing, painful, 
undignified and futile because it had no chance of 
success.    The doctor did not think that there was 
an imminent risk of cardiac or respiratory 
collapse but made the decision that he did to 
avoid the possibility of the nursing staff being 
obliged to administer CPR, even if the chance of it 
needing to be administered was remote.  
 
The registrar did not discuss matters with Carl’s 
mother:  
“firstly because I did not think that the 
deceased was at high risk of unexpected 
deterioration over the next five hours and in 
my view was, although unwell, in a stable 
condition. Secondly because the decision was 
not based on a judgement about his quality of 
life at the time but rather the futility and 
ineffectiveness of CPR as a intervention in his 
case. In these circumstances I did not think 
that it was necessary or appropriate to call his 
next of kin at that time. It is correct that the 
form was not fully completed. My intention 
was that the missing part would be completed 
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the following morning after discussion with 
the next of kin.”    
Carl’s condition was reviewed by the registrar 
and a consultant at 8.30 am shortly before the 
registrar went off night duty. No further 
completion or variation of the DNACPR notice 
occurred.  The medical notes of that meeting set 
out five items for the treatment plan of which 
point four reads “speak to family later re 
res(uscitation) status.”  
 
Ms Winspear contacted the hospital at 11.00am 
and was told again that Carl was stable and was 
on his oxygen. Shortly after this call she received 
a further call and was told that the doctors 
wanted to speak to her before visiting hours had 
started. She did not have the impression that this 
meeting was urgent because of a deterioration in 
Carl's health. She arrived later that morning and 
had a conversation with a Dr Farrer, a consultant 
cardiologist and Clinical Director of the 
directorate of emergency care of the hospital.  
The precise terms of that conversation were a 
matter of dispute, there is no doubt that the 
question of cardiopulmonary resuscitation arose 
in the course of it. Ms Winspear expressed her 
strong disagreement with the suggestion that if 
Carl stopped breathing resuscitation should not 
be attempted. Although he was severely disabled 
she did not want him treated differently from any 
other patient and considered he enjoyed a 
reasonable quality of life at home with her.  
Following Ms Winspear’s discussion with Dr 
Farrer, the DNACPR notice was cancelled.  Carl 
was moved to an intensive care unit later that 
day, where he died in the evening.  
 
In December 2011 the claimant issued 
proceedings by way of a Part 7 claim form for a 
declaration under the HRA. She argued that 
placing the DNACPR notice on Carl's medical 
record from 3.00 am until it was cancelled 
sometime after 12.30 without any consultation 
with a person who had been caring for or 
representing his interests was a procedural 
failure and has resulted in Carl's right to respect 
for private life under Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) being 
interfered with without justification.  The 
proceedings were stayed pending the 
determination by the Court of Appeal of the 
Tracey case, and then restored for trial.  
 
The issue  
 
The Court of Appeal in Tracey made clear that, 
absent convincing reasons to the contrary, an 
adult patient with capacity has to be involved in 
the process that leads to the completion of a 
DNACPR notice, and that the very decision to 
complete a notice (whether or not it actually had 
any material difference to the treatment given) 
represented an interference with the patient’s 
private life under Article 8 ECHR.    
 
The issue for Blake J was the extent to which the 
principles in Tracey could be read across to a case 
of an adult patient without capacity; this then led 
him into a detailed consideration of the role of 
s.4(7) MCA 2005.    
 
Blake J’s decision  
 
As Blake J noted: “[t]here is nothing in the case of 
Tracey or the Strasbourg case law to suggest that 
the concept of human dignity applies any the less 
in the case of a patient without capacity” 
(paragraph 45).  He therefore accepted the 
claimant’s case that the core principle of prior 
consultation before a DNACPR decision is put into 
place on the case file applies in cases both of 
capacity and absence of capacity.   
 
  
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter December 2015 
Compendium: Capacity outside the COP 
 
Click here for all our mental capacity resources                                         Page 35 of 54 
 
Blake J also accepted the Trust’s submission that 
the practical exigencies relating to 
communication differ if the patient who is being 
treated by a doctor cannot communicate his 
wishes and beliefs.  However,  
“46.[…] [i]n my view, those considerations go 
to the question whether there is a convincing 
reason to proceed to implement a DNACPR 
decision without prior consultation. In the case 
of persons who lack capacity, the MCA spells 
out when and with whom a decision taker 
must consult; if it is not 'practicable or 
appropriate' to consult a person identified in 
s.4 (7) before the decision is made or acted on, 
then there would be a convincing reason to 
proceed without consultation.  
 
47.If, on the other hand, it is both practicable 
and appropriate to consult then in the absence 
of some other compelling reason against 
consultation, the decision to file the DNACPR 
notice on the patient's medical records would 
be procedurally flawed. It would not meet the 
requirements of s.4(7) MCA; it would 
accordingly not be in accordance with the law. 
It would be an interference with Article 8(1) 
that is not justified under Article 8(2) for two 
reasons:- 
 
i) a decision that is not taken 'in 
accordance with law' cannot 
justify an interference with the 
right to respect afforded under 
Article 8(1); 
 
ii) if consultation was appropriate 
and practicable there is no 
convincing reason to depart from it 
as an important part of the 
procedural obligations inherent in 
Article 8. 
 
48. The discharge of this procedural obligation 
is not a matter of challenging a clinical 
judgment as to the appropriate treatment for 
a patient. The formation of such a judgment is 
a necessary first step in the decision making 
process before a DNACPR notice is placed on 
file but not generally a sufficient one. 
On the facts of the case before him, Blake J was 
not satisfied that it was other than practicable 
and appropriate to have attempted to contact Ms 
Winspear before the DNACPR notice was affixed 
to Carl's records.   He was therefore satisfied that 
there was was a breach of the s.4(7) MCA 2005, 
such that no s.5(2) MCA 2005 defence existed to 
this claim, and also that there was a violation of 
the procedural duty under Article 8(2) ECHR.   
Blake J granted her a declaration reflecting the 
procedural breach of Article 8(2) ECHR, a 
declaration alone (on the facts of this case) 




This decision is significant, firstly, for confirming 
that the principles set down in Tracey apply 
across the board.   It is likely to mean that the 
most recent iteration of the guidance on 
Decisions Relating to Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (updated after Tracey) will need to 
be modified further so as to make express 
reference to the procedural requirements of 
s.4(7) MCA 2005 when it comes to decisions 
made in the context of those who do not have 
capacity to participate in the discussions relating 
to DNACPR notices.  
 
The decision is also significant far beyond the 
(narrow, but important) context of DNACPR 
notices.   The question of what, precisely, the 
impact of a failure to comply with s.4(7) MCA 
2005 means in relation had been touched upon 
previously but not conclusively determined by 
the Court of Appeal in ZH v Cmr of the Police for 
the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 3021 (at 
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paragraph 41, not 51 as noted by Blake J).   Blake 
J has made clear that:  
 
1. Section 4(7) imposes a duty to consult those 
identified in the section unless it is not 
practicable and appropriate to do so (i.e. 
active steps must be taken to consult, rather 
than simply passively taking into account 
views that the decision-maker may be aware 
of);  
 
2. A failure to comply with that duty will mean 
that the decision-maker cannot then rely 
upon s.5 MCA in any claim brought for 
breaches of the ECHR (or, logically, at 
common law, for instance for trespass to the 
person where a procedure is carried out upon 
them).  
 
This decision therefore shows that s.4(7) is – and 
should – have teeth.   It is important also in this 
context to remember the purpose of consultation 
– it is not merely to obtain the views of relevant 
individuals as to what they would like, but “in 
particular [to obtain] their view of what [P’s] 
attitude would be,” as a vital component in 
making the decision that is “right for P as an 
individual human being” (Aintree at paragraphs 
39 and 45).  
 
Short note: capacity and coroners 
 
In a case illustrating that an understanding of 
mental capacity is necessary for coroners, it is 
reported that an inquest in Staffordshire recorded 
that a 58 year old man, David Walwyn, 
committed suicide by refusing to eat. In reaching 
that conclusion, it is reported that assistant 
coroner for Staffordshire South, Margaret Jones, 
aid: "He made it clear he had chosen to die and 
refused support. It was his right to refuse to eat 
as he had the mental capacity." 
 
Mr Walwyn died on 2 July 2015 after he stopped 
eating on 28 March 2015. The inquest heard he 
had left a suicide note with his cousin and had 
made it clear that he wanted to die. 
 
A representative for South Staffordshire and 
Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 
gave evidence at the inquest. She said Mr 
Walwyn, who lived alone, had a longstanding 
history with mental health services but that in 
relation to the decision not to eat he had been 
assessed as having capacity: “a psychiatrist and 
his GP met with his cousin. The Trust assessed his 
capacity to make a decision that he wanted to die 
by stopping eating and we had to respect that. He 
had mental capacity throughout.” 
College of Policy Consultation on 
Mental Health Practice 
 
The College of Policing has launched 
a consultation on its mental health authorised 
professional practice to provide guidance to the 
police service in England and Wales. It is wide 
ranging in its scope, covering strategic 
considerations, mental vulnerability, capacity and 
illness, detention, crime and criminal justice. This 
is a great opportunity for those with a view on 
mental health and policing to express those views 
to inform the final version of the guidance.  The 
consultation closes on 1 January 2016. 
 
Insofar as the mental capacity provisions are 
concerned, we note there are a number of legal 
inaccuracies which will hopefully be ironed out 
during this consultation stage. For example, of 
some concern (not least as it reflects a 
misunderstanding that we regularly encounter) is 
the indication that the police can deprive liberty 
using MCA s4B.  It is important to understand 
that this provision, relating to deprivation of 
liberty necessary for life-sustaining treatment or 
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vital acts, is only available “while a decision as 
respects any relevant issue is sought" from the 
Court of Protection. It cannot therefore be used 
by the police (or anyone else) outside court 
proceedings.   
No voice unheard no right ignored: 
the government response  
 
In November the government published its 
response to “No voice unheard, no right ignored - 
a consultation for people with learning 
disabilities, autism and mental health conditions”  
 
The response states that the consultation is 
aimed at accelerating progress to achieve four 
things: 
 
 people in charge, supported by family and 
friends; 
 
 inclusion and independence in the 
community; 
 
 the right care in the right place, and 
 
 very clear accountability and 
responsibility throughout the system. 
 
The consultation response is structured around 5 
key aims, intended to make differences between 
now and 2020 so that people should:  
 
1. expect to be supported to live independently 
as part of a community and in a home they 
have chosen; 
 
2. know their views will be listened to and be 
able to challenge decisions about them and 
about their care;  
 
3. have clearly stipulated rights within the 
Mental Health Act; 
 
4. be able to exercise control over the support 
they receive with a personal budget, and 
expect that different health and local 
services will organise themselves around 
their needs, and  
 
5. know that professionals are looking out for 
their physical health needs as well as their 
mental health needs.  
 
The government proposals for the 5 aims are as 
follows: 
 
Aim 1: people should expect to be supported to 
live independently as part of a community and in a 




 guidance for commissioners of health and 
social care services on: 
 
o promoting wellbeing, and factors to take 
into account when considering living 
arrangements, including how to support 
people to live independently, in the 
community and respecting their wishes 
and desires; 
 
o exercise of Care Act 2014 local ‘market-
shaping’ duties to further aid the 
development of a diverse market of 
community-based provision, and 
 
o the need to ensure sufficiency of supply of 
community-based provision. 
 
 amend Mental Health Act regulations to 
change the information required on 
  
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter December 2015 
Compendium: Capacity outside the COP 
 
Click here for all our mental capacity resources                                         Page 38 of 54 
 
admission so that Approved Mental Health 
Professionals have to consider and record 
whether assessment and treatment could be 
provided without detention in hospital. 
 
Aim 2: people should know their views will be 
listened to and be able to challenge decisions 




 consider how Care and Treatment Review 
principles/processes can (i) be extended to 
local authority-led and other placements and 
(ii) be strengthened, including if necessary by 
statutory force; 
 consider how learning from implementation 
of CTRs can inform the Care Programme 
Approach (CPA), and whether this guidance 
could helpfully be updated/expanded 
(subject to the Law Commission’s 
consultation in the context of Deprivation of 
Liberty safeguards) consider introduction of a 
single advocacy model bringing together 
existing statutory schemes (including 
Independent Mental Health Advocates and 
Independent Mental Capacity Advocates) 
and providing these on an opt-out (rather 
than opt-in) basis; 
 
 pilot access to a named social worker who 
will provide professional advice and support, 
be the primary point of contact for the 
service user and their family/carers wherever 
the person is being supported, and provide a 
professional voice across the system; 
 
 strengthen work being undertaken as part of 
the Transforming Care Programme’s 
‘empowering people’ workstream and/or the 
Department’s strategic partner programme 
to: 
 
o build on the new accessible information 
standard to ensure that people receive 
information in formats that they can 
understand, and that they receive 
appropriate support to help them to 
communicate; 
 
o build on the proposal of a (nonstatutory) 
‘Charter of Rights’ to provide definitive 
and accessible information on their rights, 
and how to access support to exercise 
them, and promote use of advance 
statements; 
 
 guidance for commissioners of health and 
social care services on involving people with 
learning disabilities/ autism/mental health 
conditions in the design, development and 
delivery of services; 
 
 monitor implementation of the new service 
model for commissioners of health and social 
care services, and of Care and Treatment 
Reviews on care planning, admissions, 
transfers and discharges and consider the 
need for further legislative proposals in 
response to a review of impact. 
 
Aim 3: people should have clearly stipulated rights 




 recognising the issues for people with 
learning disabilities, autism and mental 
health conditions in the criminal justice 
system:  
 
o an end to the use of police cells as a place 
of safety for children and young people 
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detained under sections 135 or 136 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983  
 
o no one detained under sections 135 or 
136 to be held in a ‘place of safety’ for 
more than 24 hours without being 
assessed by a relevant professional and 
either discharged or admitted (this and 
the above to be achieved via the Policing 
& Criminal Justice Bill together with other 
changes resulting from the review of 
sections 135/136)  
 
 subject to further consultation, make 
changes to the Mental Health Act 1983:  
o enabling patients and families to 
challenge whether their wishes and 
feelings were appropriately considered 
when making applications for detention;  
 
o amending provisions regarding “nearest 
relative” to ensure this meets the wishes 
and needs of people subject to the Act;  
 
o making the Mental Health Act Code of 
Practice statutory guidance for NHS 
commissioners as it is for professionals, 
local authorities and providers;  
 
 review safeguards regarding renewals of 
detention (e.g. expansion of requirement for 
an independent second doctor’s opinion);  
 
 propose amending the Act to make 
provisions about the discharge of patients to 
community placements amounting to a 
deprivation of liberty;  
 
 further consideration in principle of whether 
and how the Mental Health Act should apply 
to people with learning disabilities and/or 
autism and if this remains appropriate.  
 
Aim 4: people should be able to exercise control 
over the support they receive with a personal 
budget, and expect that different health and local 





 review data available for local and national 
transparency and accountability with metrics 
including: 
 
o delayed discharges; 
 
o personal budgets/integrated budgets; 
 
o integrated personal commissioning; 
 
 work with NHS England and the Local 
Government Association to develop guidance 
and tools (e.g. consent templates) to ensure 
information is shared legitimately and in 
accordance with professional standards and 
good practice; and 
 
 consider what further actions are required to 
embed solutions to generic data governance 
issues, especially where data sharing is 
currently impeded in relation to the care of 
people with learning disabilities, autism and 
mental health conditions, where this would 
meet aims of good commissioning practice 
and improved patient care. 
 
Aim 5: people should know that professionals are 
looking out for their physical health needs as well 
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 guidance to commissioners of health and 
social care services to clarify responsibilities 
for ensuring physical healthcare needs are 
met alongside mental health needs; 
 
 subject to further consultation, make 
changes to the Mental Health Act 1983 
regarding responsibility to ensure physical 
care needs are met for mental health 
inpatients/detained patients to ensure the 
individual is registered with a general 
practitioner and is able to benefit from 
programmes such as individual health 
checks, screening tests and health action 
plans. 
 
A very considerable degree of skepticism has 
been expressed on social media and elsewhere as 
to the extent to which any of the above will 
actually be translated into legislation (or 
otherwise be brought to bear so as to make real 
changes).    It will be necessary to ensure that 
pressure continues to be brought to bear to 
ensure that the document does not simply start 
to gather dust on the shelves in Whitehall.  
Inaugural UK Mental Disability Law 
Conference 
 
The Inaugural UK Mental Disability Law 
Conference is to be held at Nottingham on 30 
June and 1 July 2016.  This conference is intended 
to bring together academics and other scholars 
with an interest in mental disability law for the 
first meeting of what it is hoped will be an 
ongoing academic association or network.  Unlike 
the SLSA, this is a specific conference devoted to 
mental disability law (including issues relating to 
mental health/psychosocial disability, learning 
disability, disabilities associated with old age and 
mental capacity).  The inaugural conference is 
sponsored jointly by the School of Law at the 
University of Nottingham and the Institute of 
Mental Health, with the endorsement of the 
Human Rights Law Centre at the University of 
Nottingham. 
 
The Nottingham conference will combine plenary 
and breakout sessions.  It is expected that half 
the presenters at plenary sessions will be people 
with lived experience of mental health/mental 
disability services.  It is also hoped that at least 
one fifth of the delegates to the conference will 
have such lived experience. 
 
The Nottingham conference organisers invite 
offers of papers for the breakout sessions from 
scholars of any discipline relevant to law and 
governance relating to mental disability (including 
psychosocial disabilities/mental health problems, 
learning disabilities, and dementia and related 
disorders of old age). There is no restriction on 
methodology:  papers may be empirical, policy-
centred, historical, analytic, traditional legal, or 
theoretical, in approach.  The deadline for offers 
of papers for the breakout sessions is 1 May 
2016.   
 
A pre-conference is planned for post-graduate 
students, prior to the Nottingham conference. 
 




For all those looking for Christmas gifts, we have 
gathered together three book reviews (two by 
Alex, one by Annabel) for your consideration.6  
 
                                                 
6
 Full disclosure: we grateful to the author and publishers 
respectively for providing us with copies of the three works 
reviewed.  We are always happy to review works in the field 
of mental capacity (broadly defined). 
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Care Act Manual: 2nd edition: Tim Spencer-Lane 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, paperback, £72)7 
 
In between trying to sort out the law relating to 
deprivation of liberty, Tim Spencer-Lane has done 
us all an enormous favour by updating his 
invaluable Care Act Manual.  He knows more 
about this topic than anyone else, having led the 
Law Commission project leading ultimately to the 
Care Act.   In the first edition of the book, 
published in 2014, he shared that knowledge with 
us at a time when we had yet to have the 
statutory guidance and most of the necessary 
secondary legislation.   The first edition, 
therefore, of necessity represented to some 
extent speculation as to what might happen, in 
circumstances where, as we all know, the devil is 
in the detail. 
 
We now know much of the detail (not all of it 
good).   This second edition therefore includes 
expert commentary on the secondary legislation, 
as well as the statutory guidance (running, alone, 
to some 500 pages).  It is therefore a very much a 
book that is in every way much bigger than the 
last edition.  What the book loses in portability, 
however, it more than makes up for in the width 
and depth of its coverage of Part 1 of the Care 
Act, the relevant schedules, and the supporting 
apparatus. 
 
As with the previous edition, the Manual does 
not seek to address the other parts of the Act, 
and to this extent the title is 
misleading.  However, for anyone who needs to 
grapple with the new regime for the provision of 
social services in England, this book is absolutely 
invaluable. 
 
                                                 
7
 Review by Alex.  
Deprivation of Liberty: A Handbook: HHJ Nasreen 
Pearce and DJ Sue Jackson (Jordan Publishing, 
2015, £45; paperback; ebook)8 
 
This timely book, published by Jordans, seeks to 
distil the substantive and procedural law relating 
to deprivation of liberty in the health and social 
care sectors down to manageable proportions 
(both in terms of complexity and in terms of 
length).   As to the latter, the handbook succeeds 
excellently – commentary, relevant statutory 
provisions, guidance and forms are all to be 
found in 250 pages (of which just over 100 pages 
represents commentary).   As to the former, the 
authors – a retired Circuit Judge and current 
District Judge – have succeeded in substantial 
part in pulling together the various complex 
threads in a clear and simple (but not simplistic) 
fashion.    They have, however, been somewhat 
hampered by the fast-moving pace of 
developments in the area; whilst they managed 
(just) to lever in the NRA decision of Charles J in 
September, they opined that it would be likely to 
be appealed, which has not happened; they were 
also unable to include coverage of the LF decision 
relating to deprivation of liberty in the ICU 
setting.   The law is therefore very much (and 
very clearly stated as being) as at September 
2015. 
 
With that caveat, though, the book stands as an 
extremely useful primer for those new to the 
area and, in particular, for lawyers needing to 
navigate their way around the provisions.   In 
terms of other professionals, I might respectfully 
suggest it could usefully be read alongside the 
Law Society’s Practical Guide to Deprivation of 
Liberty, which includes significantly greater 
coverage of what deprivation of liberty actually 
looks like on the ground.  It is perhaps only 
because I was so involved in this Guide that I 
                                                 
8
 Review by Alex.  
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regretted the absence of any mention of it in the 
book – notwithstanding the fact that it was 
commissioned by the Department of Health to 
stand as an informal update to Chapter 2 of the 
DOLS Code of Practice (which is also – perhaps 
curiously – also missing. 
 
There are a couple of minor quibbles that I might 
have with some of the authors’ commentary (in 
particular, the comment at 6.5.4 as to new COP 
Rule 3A(1)(a)(e) is, with respect, just plain wrong: 
it is not a meaningless provision but is, rather, the 
provision that enables the COP to dispense with 
joining P in the vast majority of applications to it 
– i.e. uncontested property and 
affairs).   However, overall, and with the caveat 
that it will be necessary for those reading the 
book to ensure that they take steps to keep 
themselves updated as the law continues to 
involve, the authors are to be commended on an 
extremely useful introductory guide to this 
bewilderingly complex area of the law which fits 
well into the Jordan’s stable of practitioner texts. 
 
A Practical Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 
2005: Putting the Principles of the Act into 
Practice: Matthew Graham and Jakki Cowley 
(Foreword by Alex Ruck Keene) (Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers, 2015, £19.99, paperback, ebook)9 
 
This succinct book concentrates less on the 
theory of mental capacity law and more on the 
practice. Starting with a chapter on “A New 
Culture of Care”, the book sets mental capacity 
issues in a wider practical context. In navigating 
the key topics in mental capacity law, covering 
capacity, advocacy, care planning, best interests 
and liberty, the book offers helpful practical tips 
and guidance throughout.  
 
                                                 
9
 Review by Annabel.  
The spirit of the Mental Capacity Act resonates 
throughout the text. For example, in addition to 
the chapter on “Assessing Capacity”, there is a 
chapter on “Maximising Capacity” which 
emphasises the importance of providing 
appropriate support so that a person may be able 
to make their own decisions. The themes of 
independence, liberty and empowerment are 
recurrent throughout the guide and the emphasis 
is very much on the support that can be offered 
to individuals.   
 
There are a number of useful practical tools 
which feature in this guide, such as a sample 
report for IMCAs, sample agenda for best 
interests’ meetings and a checklist for supported 
decision-making. The case studies, based on real 
life examples, are particularly useful for exploring 
various scenarios in which the Act plays a part.  
 
In summary, this book is a useful resource for 
practitioners. It is an excellent plain-English guide 
to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The points are 
neatly broken down into bitesize sections (often 
in bullet-points) which makes the text easy to 
read and digest, or handy as a quick reference 
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Education (Scotland) Bill – “best 
interests” no more 
 
In the September Newsletter we reported 
concerns about aspects of the Education 
(Scotland) Bill, and described the submission of 
the Mental Health and Disability Sub-Committee 
of the Law Society of Scotland.  We are pleased 
to report that 64 amendments lodged by Scottish 
Government on 23rd November 2015, and duly 
passed, met those concerns.   
 
Concerns centered on the proposed “capacity” 
and “best interests” tests as to whether it would 
be appropriate that children and young persons 
(young persons being 16 and 17-year olds) should 
themselves participate in procedures.  The 
Committee argued that the proposed “maturity” 
element of the capacity test should be eliminated 
in the case of 16 and 17-year olds.  A new 
definition of “lacking capacity” has been 
introduced in the case of young persons, namely 
that “a young person lacks capacity to do 
something if the young person does not have 
sufficient understanding to do it”.  A large 
number of amendments delete references to 
young persons altogether. 
 
As we and others commented, the introduction 
of a “best interests” test in Scots law – bearing in 
mind that such a test was explicitly rejected for 
the purposes of adult incapacity law – seemed 
particularly inappropriate at a time when the 
concept of a paternalistic “best interests” test 
had been rejected in General Comment No 1 
(2014) “Article 12: Equal recognition before the 
law” of the Un Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.  The Mental Health and 
Disability Sub-Committee submitted that if the 
purpose of the “best interests” test was to allow 
children to be shielded from potentially harmful 
information, then the approach should not be 
that a “best interests” test should be satisfied, 
but rather a question of whether application of 
safeguards to prevent any such apprehended 
harm would be justified.  There will no doubt be a 
general welcome to the removal, by these 
Scottish Government amendments, of all 
references to “best interests”.  The amendments 
replace “is in the best interests” with “would 
adversely affect the wellbeing”.   
 
It is important to understand that both “capacity” 
and any adverse effect upon wellbeing are not 
automatic bars to participation.  They are matters 
which the education authority is required to take 
into account.  These are also matters to be 
considered by the Additional Support for Learning 
Tribunal in relation to proceedings before the 
Tribunal. 
 
Some of the adjustments achieve consistency 
with existing legislation, and in some places it is 
proposed that there be regulatory powers to 
change criteria.  The reason for this is that if 
criteria – particularly outcome criteria – are 
altered in future across a range of legislation, in 
practical terms it will be much easier to do that 
by regulation rather than by a raft of amending 
provisions to fixed statutory criteria.  It has been 
confirmed that this will be covered in the 
Explanatory Notes.  It is also understood that, in 
accordance with a subsequent suggestion by the 
Mental Health & Disability Sub-Committee, an 
obligation upon Scottish Ministers will be 
inserted in Stage 3 amendments to require them 
to consult before exercising such regulatory 
powers. 
 
The willingness of Scottish Government to 
consult meaningfully and accept reasoned 
proposals is to be commended. 
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[editorial note: these developments also show 
the power of cross-border working: it was 
concerns raised by Paul Skowron on Lucy Series’ 
website which alerted Alex to the issues, and, in 
turn, led to work being done by the Scottish Law 
Society MHDC, led by Adrian and, ultimately, to 
these amendments].  
Out of step across the borders 
 
On 17th November 2015 Lord Armstrong 
dismissed a petition by Milton Keynes Council for 
review of a decision by Scottish Ministers 
determining the ordinary residence of a lady 
identified as Mrs JR: Decision [2015] CSOH 156, 
available here. 
 
According to the Judgment, Mrs R was born on 
19th March 1932.  She formerly lived in her own 
home in Milton Keynes.  In 2005 she was 
diagnosed with dementia.  Her mental and 
physical health deteriorated, and on 20th 
December 2008 she was admitted to an 
assessment unit, still within the local authority 
area of Milton Keynes Council.  On 7th January 
2009 the Court of Protection appointed the 
Council’s finance manager as Mrs R’s property 
and affairs deputy.  A mental capacity assessment 
at that time determined that “she lacked the 
capacity to decide for herself where she should 
live”. 
 
Mrs R’s daughter decided that she would like her 
mother to reside close to her, in or near 
Edinburgh.  She identified a care home in 
Musselburgh, within the area of East Lothian 
Council.  Milton Keynes Council advised the 
daughter to approach East Lothian Council about 
funding, as Milton Keynes Council was of the view 
that Mrs R might be entitled to free personal and 
nursing care.  On 25th February 2009 Mrs R was 
discharged from the care centre in the Milton 
Keynes area and driven by her daughter to the 
care home in Musselburgh, all on the same day.  
Mrs R has lived in the care home in Musselburgh 
ever since.  East Lothian Council had no 
involvement in the placement of Mrs R in the 
care home in Musselburgh, nor initially did that 
Council make any payments in relation to her 
accommodation there.  Financial matters were 
arranged privately between the home in 
Musselburgh and the daughter.   
 
By order dated 2nd June 2009, taking effect on 2nd 
July 2009, the daughter was appointed property 
and affairs deputy in place of Milton Keynes 
Council’s finance manager.  On 10th July 2009 Mrs 
R’s needs for community care services were 
assessed by East Lothian Council (under section 
12A of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968).  Mrs 
R was assessed as being in need of residential 
accommodation with nursing.  East Lothian 
Council accordingly assumed responsibility as 
“authority of the moment” for the funding of her 
care placement, and made payments to the 
Musselburgh home from 8th July 2009.  Mrs R’s 
former home in Milton Keynes was sold in 2010.  
A reference in the Judgment (paragraph 38) to 
“East Kilbride” would appear to be a 
typographical error. 
 
Under section 86 of the 1968 Act, where one 
local authority incurs expenditure under that Act 
in the provision of accommodation for a person 
ordinarily resident in the area of another local 
authority, that expenditure is recoverable from 
such other local authority, expressly including a 
local authority in England & Wales.  Section 86 
also provides that any question as to the ordinary 
residence of a person under that section shall be 
determined by Scottish Ministers.   
 
On 26th March 2015, Scottish Ministers 
determined that there had been no change in 
Mrs R’s ordinary residence for the purposes of 
section 86, and that she accordingly remained 
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ordinarily resident in Milton Keynes.  Scottish 
Ministers had regard to the decision of the House 
of Lords in Shah v London Borough of Barnet 
1983 2 AC 309 (“Shah”) and to Scottish 
Government Guidance Circular 3/2010.   Milton 
Keynes Council challenged that determination on 
the following grounds, namely (1) that Scottish 
Ministers applied the wrong legal test; (2) they 
erred in law by failing to consider the correct 
periods of residence; (3) they erred in their 
consideration of what constitutes a voluntary act; 
(4) perversity; and (5) in reaching their decision, 
they acted in a manner beyond their jurisdiction. 
 
The application was opposed by Scottish 
Ministers.  East Lothian Council entered the 
process as interested party.  Remarkably, Mrs R 
was not represented in the proceedings and the 
Judgment does not narrate whether any 
consideration was given as to whether she, or at 
least her interests, should be represented.  There 
also appears to have been no enquiry into 
whether she had ascertainable wishes and 
feelings (or, in the terminology of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, any will and preferences) at least to 
the extent of knowing whether she was content 
and settled in her placement in Musselburgh.  
One would have thought it appropriate for her 
and her interests to be central to the 
proceedings.  Whether she should be deemed as 
having her settled home in one country or 
another is hardly unimportant, particularly in the 
circumstances that (as noted in the November 
Newsletter) whether she is subject to Scottish 
rates of income tax will now depend upon 
whether she has a “close connection to Scotland” 
or her “main place of residence” in Scotland.  It 
might have been appropriate for the court to 
have heard submissions as to a possible scenario 
in which Scottish Ministers had determined that 
her ordinary residence remained in England, yet 
for purposes of any proceedings before the Court 
of Protection or alternatively under the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 she would be 
regarded as habitually resident in Scotland, and 
for purposes of paying the Scottish rate of 
income tax (and thus contributing to the Scottish 
nursing and care payments denied to her if her 
ordinary residence remained in England) she 
were determined to be resident in Scotland 
under the tests for that purpose. 
 
Lord Armstrong upheld the determination of 
Scottish Ministers.  Although not disclosed in the 
Judgment, the hearing took place on 15th October 
2015.  By then, new Scottish Government 
guidance dated 1st June 2015 had been 
introduced – see “New guidance – old flaw?” in 
the July Newsletter and, following the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Regina (Cornwall Council) 
Secretary of State for Health and Another [2015] 
UKSC 46 (“Cornwall”), the further item “New 
guidance – old flaw – or new interpretation of the 
law?” in the September Newsletter.  See those 
articles for our view on the core question of 
when ordinary residence changes where the 
adult in question may not be fully capable of 
making the relevant decision. 
 
It is understood that only the 2010 Scottish 
Government circular was considered.  However, 
it does not appear that the case was pled on the 
basis that Scottish Ministers had failed to follow 
their own guidance.  On the face of matters, it 
appears that they did follow their own guidance.  
That is however irrelevant to the question of 
whether they applied the correct test.  Of course, 
perhaps the English guidance is wrong and the 
Scottish guidance is correct, but it does seem 
relevant at least to consider a situation in which 
the guidance in the two countries, hitherto stated 
to have been derived from precisely the same 
(entirely English) case law, should produce a 
situation in which, as the 2015 Scottish guidance 
puts it: “The approach in England differs in that it 
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encourages a broader view than in Scotland”.  Put 
bluntly, it would appear that the English 
guidance, if applied to the available facts in the 
case of Mrs R, would have produced the opposite 
outcome. 
 
The decision itself should be referred to for its 
long and somewhat complex arguments.  Here 
we focus on one feature.  English case authority 
was for long based, and current English guidance 
is still based, on the two tests generally referred 
to as “Vale 1” and “Vale 2” set out in R Waltham 
Forest London Borough Council, ex p Vale, The 
Times, 25 February 1995 (“Vale”).  As they are 
not set out in the Judgment, it is worth quoting 
them here:  
 
Vale test 1: “Where a person was so mentally 
handicapped that she was totally dependent 
on a parent or guardian, her ordinary 
residence was that of the parent or guardian: 
Mr Justice Taylor proceeds to expand on this 
to state that it was clear from Lord Scarman’s 
speech in Shah that the mind of the claimant 
was important in two respects in determining 
ordinary residence: the residence must be 
voluntarily adopted and there must be a 
degree of settled purpose.  In this case 
however, the applicant was not capable of 
deciding where to live and it is unreal to speak 
of settled purpose: the decision as to where 
she should live was at all times her parents’ 
decision”.   
 
Vale test 2: “The Alternative Approach involves 
considering a person’s ordinary residence as if 
they had capacity.  All the facts of the person’s 
case should be considered including physical 
presence in a particular place and the nature 
and purpose of that presence as outlined in 
Shah without requiring the person themselves 
to have adopted the residence voluntarily”. 
Lord Armstrong disregarded any question of 
“habitual residence” on the basis that its 
interpretation is a doubtful guide in matters of 
“ordinary residence”, a view taken in Cornwall 
and noted in our commentary on Cornwall.  The 
Supreme Court in Cornwall confirmed that there 
are not, in fact, two separate Vale tests, but “they 
were complementary, common-sense approaches 
to the application of the Shah test to a person 
unable to make decisions for herself; that is, to 
the single question whether her period of actual 
residence with her parents was sufficiently 
‘settled’ to amount to ordinary residence” 
(paragraph 47). 
 
There may be scope for discussion as to whether 
Lord Armstrong’s decision accorded with what 
Lord Carnwath intended.  Just as the 2010 
Scottish guidance founds upon Vale test 1 and 
disregards Vale test 2, likewise Lord Armstrong’s 
decision included the following passages: 
“[51]  I am satisfied that the analysis of the 
dicta in the cases cited, in particular those to 
be found in the decisions of Shah and 
Cornwall, as submitted for the respondents 
and the interested party, is correct.  Whilst it 
must be recognised that the factual 
circumstances in these cases were not on all 
fours with the present case, on the basis of the 
reported cases cited to me, the dictum of Lord 
Scarman as quoted in Shah, remains the 
leading modern authority on the correct 
meaning of the expression ‘ordinary 
residence’.  His identification of the two 
requisite elements required in any assessment 
was neither overruled nor undermined by the 
dicta in Cornwall.  To the extent that, in 
Cornwall, the two approaches considered in 
Vale were reviewed, the conclusion reached 
was that they were not separable but 
complementary approaches to the test in 
Shah.  In that context, it is to be noted that the 
last three lines of paragraph 47 of the decision 
in Cornwall, viz: ‘… that is …the single question 
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whether her period of actual residence with 
her parents was sufficiently settled to amount 
to ordinary residence.’ should, in my view, be 
read as an expression of the issue which was 
to be determined, rather than as a 
reformulation of the test set out by Lord 
Scarman in Shah, or as a statement intended 
to define exhaustively the constituent parts of 
the relevant test. 
 
“[52] On that basis, the determination of 
whether there has been a change in ordinary 
residence must necessarily involve an 
assessment of the extent to which any 
adoption of a particular abode has been 
voluntary.  In the case of a person lacking 
mental capacity, such an assessment must 
necessarily involve a consideration of the 
nature of such legal authority as there is in 
place.  That is consistent with the legal 
framework in place in Scotland to protect the 
interests of those lacking full capacity.  The 
respondents and the interested party were 
correct therefore to assert that the Scottish 
Government Circular sets out a correct 
statement of the law in that regard, and that 
it was appropriate for the respondents to 
follow the guidance contained within it. 
 
“[53]  On that basis, given the lack of mental 
capacity on the part of Mrs R, the absence of 
any legal authority on the part of [her 
daughter] to make decisions regarding her 
mother’s personal welfare was fatal to any 
prospect of a finding that, notwithstanding 
the duration of Mrs R’s presence in Scotland, 
there had been a change of her ordinary 
residence from Milton Keynes to East Lothian.” 
Perhaps it still remains relevant to take account 
of the view expressed by the Supreme Court in re 
LC (Children) [2014] UKSC 1, that “insofar as Lord 
Scarman’s observation [in Shah] might be taken 
to exclude the relevance of a person’s state of 
mind to her habitual residence, I suggest that this 
court should consign it to legal history, along with 
the test which he propounded”. 
 
The implications of this decision, and of the 
distinctive stance of Scottish Ministers which it 
endorses, are still being assimilated.  There would 
appear to be a proliferation of widening fissures 
including in “ordinary residence” between 
England & Wales, and Scotland; between habitual 
residence and ordinary residence; between social 
care and taxation purposes (as suggested above); 
and even in “ordinary residence” between social 
care and health care purposes.  For drawing that 
last point to our attention, we are indebted to 
delegates at a seminar for CCP Seminars in 
Edinburgh on 4th December 2015 at which 
Adrian’s colleague with TC Young Alison Hempsey 
discussed this case (and at which Jill and Adrian 
also spoke – see “Conferences” below for the first 
repeat of that event): this point causes particular 
potential problems for integrated health and 
social care partnerships. 
 
One can certainly say that whereas the Scottish 
guidance of 2010 and 2015 noted that there 
were no Scottish decisions on the interpretation 
of “ordinary residence” for the purpose of liability 
for social care costs, we do now have such a 
decision.  At time of writing it is not yet known 
whether that decision may be appealed.  
Whether it is or is not, it is now unlikely to be the 
last exploration of these issues before the 
Scottish courts. 
 
Adrian D Ward 
 
Mental Welfare Commission for 
Scotland promotes awareness of 
powers of attorney  
 
On 13 November, the Mental Welfare 
Commission commenced a campaign to promote 
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knowledge and understanding of powers of 
attorney amongst hospital ward staff, care home 
staff and GPs in Scotland. The awareness raising 
includes guidance on important considerations 
both when someone is thinking of signing a 
power of attorney and also when someone within 
their care has granted one. It is supported by 
three leaflets that can be accessed here. 
 
Such a campaign is to be very much welcomed. 
The granting of a power of attorney is an 
expression of an individual’s autonomy and can 
be used to ensure, insofar as it is possible, that 
the person’s will and preferences are respected 
and acted on in the event of their incapacity. This 
is underpinned by an increasing body of 
European Court of Human Rights rulings on 
Article 8 ECHR which might not yet have directly 
addressed the issue of powers of attorney but 
certainly reinforce the importance of respecting a 
person’s legal capacity10. Moreover, on the face 
of it powers of attorney may arguably fulfil the 
requirements of Articles 12(3) and (4) of the 
UNCRPD11 although whether they pass muster 
under the Committee on the Rights of Persons’ 
General Comment No 1 interpreting Article 1212, 
which not specifically refer to powers of attorney 
or similar arrangements13, remains to be seen.  
 
This development comes at the same time as yet 
another repetition of the successful joint 
                                                 
10
 Shtukarutov v Russia, paras 87-89; X and Y v the 
Netherlands, paras 102 and 109; Sykora, paras 101-103. 
See also Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation R(99) 4 on principles concerning the legal 
protection of incapable adults, paras 3, 6 and 9. 
11
J  Stavert, ‘The Exercise of Legal Capacity, Supported 
Decision- Making and Scotland’s Mental Health and 
Incapacity Legislation: Working with CRPD Challenges’ 
(2015) 4 Laws 296-313. 
12
 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
General Comment No 1 (2014) Article 12: Equal recognition 
before the law, CROPD/C/GC/1, 19 May 2014.  
13
 Ibid, para 17. 
campaign by Glasgow City Council and Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board (with technical 
support from TC Young) to encourage people to 
grant Powers of Attorney.  
 
Jill Stavert           
Mental Welfare Commission for 
Scotland: Advice on hidden 
surveillance 
 
On 2 December 2015, the Mental Welfare 
Commission published advice on the use of 
hidden surveillance which can be accessed here  
  
This advice has been publlished as a consequence 
of an awareness of covert surveillance being used 
to monitor care staff in various settings. There 
are clearly are implications for such staff and for 
those in their care and, of course, the 
Commission’s primary concern relates to the 
latter with mental illness, learning disability, 
dementia, or related conditions.    
 
The Commission acknowledges that such 
surveillance occasionally has very valid uses, such 
as exposing serious abuse of vulnerable people, 
but is also mindful that there are serious legal, 
human rights and ethical implications involved. A 
balance therefore needs to be achieved between 
protection and respect for privacy.  
    
As the advice rightly points out, capacity is 
everything. If someone is able to give valid 
consent to the surveillance and they refuse to 
consent then this must be respected. If there are 
concerns that a person with capacity is subject to 
undue influence and abuse or exploitation then 
the matter ought to be referred to the local 
authority who may consider adult protection 
measures. It also reminds of the need to assess 
capacity to consent to such surveillance on a 
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decision-specific basis14. It recognises that hidden 
surveillance is an intrusion of a person’s privacy 
and the Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for 
private and family life) issues surrounding this 
and need for proportionality. I would also add the 
potential Articles 5 (the right to liberty) and 3 
(prohibition against inhuman and degrading 
treatment) ECHR engagement where such 
surveillance is excessive.    
 
Practical considerations when considering hidden 
surveillance (for example, positioning of cameras, 
who images will be shared with and how they will 
be stored and the type of any recordings) are 
noted.  
 
Importantly, the Commission acknowledges that 
surveillance can be conducted by a wide range of 
people and organisations and thus the need for 
the situation in terms of care homes and care 
providers, friends and families, welfare guardians 
and attorneys,  criminal investigations and 
professional codes (medical and otherwise) to 
specifically address this.  
 
The Commission is clear that it is not its place to 
advocate, or not, the use of hidden surveillance 
this is in the discretion of private individuals and 
employers but they must explore and exhaust all 
reasonable alternatives before proceeding with 
such measures which must be a last resort.  
 
Jill Stavert  
                                                 
14
 As promoted by, amongst others, the WHO and the 
European Court of Human Rights (e.g. Shtukaturov v Russia 
(2008) ECHR 223) although admittedly not the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
General Comment No. 1(2014)  Article 12: Equal 
recognition before the Law, adopted 11 April 2014, para 
15). 
Scottish Government consultation 
on AWI anticipated  
 
We understand that Scottish Government 
expects to issue by the end of this year a 
consultation document not only upon the 
Scottish Law Commission report referred to in 
the parliamentary answer reproduced below, but 
seeking responses also for the purposes of the 
wider review mentioned in the answer.   Sandra 
McDonald, Public Guardian, has often referred 
publicly to the "wish list" of desired 
improvements to the 2000 Act which she has 
been accumulating for some time.   She has 
published her thoughts about possible 
introduction of a system of "graded guardianship" 
(see the OPG website). The wider review 
proposed by Scottish government, which is much 
to be welcomed, should also facilitate 
consideration of adjustments to the Scottish 
legislation to achieve full compliance with the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities - on which the work of 
the "Three Jurisdictions Project"(see [insert links]) 
continues. 
 
The full text of the relevant Parliamentary 
question and answer is as follows: 
 
Question S4W-28230: Michael Russell, Argyll and 
Bute, Scottish National Party, Date Lodged: 
30/10/2015 
To ask the Scottish Government whether it plans 
to review the adults with incapacity legislation 
and, if so, what the timescale is and what 
consultation arrangements it is planning. 
 
Answered by Paul Wheelhouse (12/11/2015): 
We have committed to consulting on the Scottish 
Law Commission’s Report on Adults with 
Incapacity. The report covers compliance of the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 with 
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Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, specifically in relation to deprivation of 
liberty issues. It is anticipated that a consultation 
paper will issue around the end of 2015, and it 
will be open to anyone with an interest to 
respond. Thereafter, a scoping exercise will 
follow in relation to a wider review of the adults 
with incapacity legislation. 
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International Protection of Adults  
 
Alex and Adrian will be participating in a seminar at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law on 11 February on Hague 35 and cross-
border matters.   More details will be available soon on the BIICL website. 
 
Fatal Accidents Inquiries and Psychiatric Patients 
 
The next seminar in the Centre for Mental Health and Incapacity Law 
series will be on Fatal Accidents Inquiries and Psychiatric Patients, to be 
held on 27 January 2016, the speakers being Jill and Dr John Crichton.   
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and training events  
 
If you would like your 
conference or training 
event to be included in 
this section in a 
subsequent issue, please 
contact one of the 
editors.   Save for those 
conferences or training 
events that are run by 
non-profit bodies, we 
would invite a donation of 
£200 to be made to Mind 
in return for postings for 
English and Welsh events.  
For Scottish events, we 
are inviting donations to 
Alzheimer Scotland Action 
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We are taking a break over the New Year, so our next 
Newsletter will be out in early February.  Please email us 
with any judgments or other news items which you think 
should be included. If you do not wish to receive this 
Newsletter in the future please contact 
marketing@39essex.com.   
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Alex Ruck Keene: alex.ruckkeene@39essex.com 
 
Alex is recommended as a ‘star junior’ in Chambers & Partners 2016 for his Court 
of Protection work.  He has been in cases involving the MCA 2005 at all levels up 
to and including the Supreme Court.  He also writes extensively about mental 
capacity law and policy, is an Honorary Research Lecturer at the University of 
Manchester, and the creator of the website 
www.mentalcapacitylawandpolicy.org.uk.  To view full CV click here. 
 
   Victoria Butler-Cole: vb@39essex.com  
 
Victoria regularly appears in the Court of Protection, instructed by the Official 
Solicitor, family members, and statutory bodies, in welfare, financial and medical 
cases.  Together with Alex, she co-edits the Court of Protection Law Reports for 
Jordans.  She is a contributing editor to Clayton and Tomlinson ‘The Law of Human 
Rights’, a contributor to ‘Assessment of Mental Capacity’ (Law Society/BMA 2009), 
and a contributor to Heywood and Massey Court of Protection Practice (Sweet and 
Maxwell). To view full CV click here. 
 
Neil Allen: neil.allen@39essex.com 
 
Neil has particular interests in human rights, mental health and incapacity law and 
mainly practises in the Court of Protection. Also a lecturer at Manchester 
University, he teaches students in these fields, trains health, social care and legal 
professionals, and regularly publishes in academic books and journals. Neil is the 
Deputy Director of the University's Legal Advice Centre and a Trustee for a mental 
health charity. To view full CV click here. 
 
 
Annabel Lee: annabel.lee@39essex.com 
  
Annabel appears frequently in the Court of Protection. Recently, she appeared in a 
High Court medical treatment case representing the family of a young man in a 
coma with a rare brain condition. She has also been instructed by local authorities, 
care homes and individuals in COP proceedings concerning a range of personal 
welfare and financial matters. Annabel also practices in the related field of human 
rights. To view full CV click here. 
 
Anna Bicarregui: anna.bicarregui@39essex.com 
 
Anna regularly appears in the Court of Protection in cases concerning welfare 
issues and property and financial affairs. She acts on behalf of local authorities, 
family members and the Official Solicitor. Anna also provides training in COP related 
matters. Anna also practices in the fields of education and employment where she 
has particular expertise in discrimination/human rights issues. To view full CV click 
here. 
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Simon Edwards: simon.edwards@39essex.com 
 
Simon has wide experience of private client work raising capacity issues, including 
Day v Harris & Ors [2013] 3 WLR 1560, centred on the question whether Sir 
Malcolm Arnold had given manuscripts of his compositions to his children when in 
a desperate state or later when he was a patient of the Court of Protection. He has 
also acted in many cases where deputies or attorneys have misused P’s assets.   To 







Adrian Ward adw@tcyoung.co.uk  
 
Adrian is a practising Scottish solicitor, a consultant at T C Young LLP, who has 
specialised in and developed adult incapacity law in Scotland over more than three 
decades.  Described in a court judgment as: “the acknowledged master of this 
subject, and the person who has done more than any other practitioner in Scotland 
to advance this area of law,”  he is author of Adult Incapacity, Adults with 




Jill Stavert: J.Stavert@napier.ac.uk  
Professor Jill Stavert is Reader in Law within the School of Accounting, Financial 
Services and Law at Edinburgh Napier University and Director of its Centre for 
Mental Health and Incapacity Law Rights and Policy.   Jill is also a member of the 
Law Society for Scotland’s Mental Health and Disability Sub-Committee, Alzheimer 
Scotland’s Human Rights and Public Policy Committee, the South East Scotland 
Research Ethics Committee 1, and the Scottish Human Rights Commission 
Research Advisory Group. She has undertaken work for the Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland (including its 2015 updated guidance on Deprivation of 
Liberty). To view full CV click here. 
 
